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 1. Introduction 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has in recent years engaged itself 
in several conflict resolution projects, in countries such as Guatemala, Mali, Burundi, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan and Rwanda. In 1999, the MFA in collaboration with the 
Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) also involved itself on Haiti and in the Dominican 
Republic. In contrast to the other involvements, which have been initiated after the 
eruption of a conflict, the involvement on Hispaniola is of a conflict preventive 
nature. The overall aim of this thesis is to examine how the Norwegian MFA in 
cooperation with NCA has contributed to preventive conflict resolution through 
dialogues and negotiations between parties in a possible future conflict situation. The 
Norwegian involvement in the current peace process between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic will constitute the basic case study of this project.  
 
The Norwegian involvement on Hispaniola was initiated due to a request from the 
former US Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madeleine Albright (Sandved 2002 [personal 
correspondence]). She contacted the former Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Knut Vollebæk, to ask if the Norwegian authorities could make an effort to facilitate 
the creation of a dialogue between the different political groups on Haiti and between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The US was concerned with the political situation 
in Haiti, but because of its controversial role in the region, it could not act as a 
facilitator. The MFA contacted the NCA for assistance, because they, through years 
of aid-related work on the island, had established relations with a range of groups 
both on the political level and within the civil society. MFA and NCA therefore 
initiated contact between different political groups and civil society organizations on 
Haiti aiming to initiate dialogue and easing the tense political situation in the country. 
At an early stage of the Norwegian involvement, it became clear that the political 
situation in Haiti could not be solved isolated and that it was also necessary to include 
the Dominican Republic in the dialogue (ibid.).  
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 The idea was that by improving the relationship between the two countries, this 
would also contribute to a stabilization of the political situation on Haiti. Therefore, 
in addition to initiate an internal dialogue on Haiti, a dialogue between 
representatives of the civil society from both countries was established, referred to as 
the Oslo Dialogue. This last process will be examined more closely in this thesis. 
Although the Norwegian representatives lately have been preoccupied with the 
internal dialogue on Haiti due to the political turmoil in the country, the dialogue 
between the two countries is still proceeding. It is now more locally driven, but the 
political leadership in Norway has emphasized the necessity to continue the dialogue 
between the two countries.  
 
The peace efforts on Hispaniola differ from other Norwegian involvements because it 
first and foremost aims at preventing the eruption of a conflict. Nevertheless, this 
thesis will be based on theories developed to explain negotiations between state 
leaders or entrusted agents of the state in already erupted conflicts or declared wars. 
However, I argue that these theories also are suitable to analyse conflict preventive 
involvements based on negotiations and dialogues between representatives of civil 
society organizations.  
1.1 Overall purpose of this thesis 
The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the Norwegian involvement in the 
conflict preventive peace efforts between Haiti and The Dominican Republic. Before 
elaborating the research question, it is however necessary to briefly describe the main 
conflicting issues between the two countries. 
1.1.1 Conflict preventive negotiations 
The conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic can be described and 
subsequently explained in light of four major issues. First, the political instability and 
the economic decline over the past decades in Haiti are important in understanding 
the large scale migration towards the Dominican Republic (Oslo Dialogue 2001a). 
The failure of boosting the economy along with the political crisis stemming from the 
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 fraudulent legislative elections in 2000 has created severe political instability on 
Haiti. The political instability and the economic situation have been major causes for 
the large scale migration from Haiti towards the Dominican Republic, as I define as 
the second source of conflict. As the economic disparities between the two countries 
have continued to grow, more and more Haitians are willing to leave behind their 
home in search for employment in the Dominican Republic. The Haitians working in 
the Dominican Republic face poor working conditions, with low payment and long 
hours, and they are under constant threat of being deported home to their country of 
origin by the Dominican authorities. This deportation of Haitians has been, and still 
is, a source of conflict between the two countries. Third, the smuggling of groceries, 
drugs and weapons at the border has been a source of conflict between the two 
countries. Fourth, the antihaitianismo that exists in the Dominican Republic is a 
source of conflict. The antihaitianismo has consequences both for the Haitian 
migrants living in the Dominican Republic, as well as for the Haitian-Dominican 
relationship. Many Dominicans tends to demonize Haitians and associate them with 
destructive power and hence danger due to their religious believes in voodoo. A more 
specific description of the conflict will be presented in chapter 4.1.1. 
 
It is important to underline that there is not an armed conflict between the two 
countries. The Norwegian initiative aims first and foremost to prevent an open 
conflict to erupt. A history of prejudices, violent clashes and constant meddling in 
each other’s affairs has created a tension between the two countries that must be 
eased to ensure that violent actions do not emerge. The involvement is important in 
improving the relations between the two countries, as the present relations have many 
negative consequences in the two societies, especially related to violations of human 
rights (Sandved 2004 [personal correspondence]).  
 
The conflict between the two countries is closely linked to internal disputes within 
both countries, which again are linked to the authorities’ lack of both capacity and 
willingness to grant basic human rights of their people (ibid.). The internal disputes 
often affect the neighbour. Haitians migrate to the Dominican Republic in search for 
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 a better life and the Dominican authorities often use Haiti as a scapegoat when there 
is a need to take focus away from internal problems.  
 
Although the economic situation in the Dominican Republic is far better than in Haiti, 
there are still high levels of unemployment, which makes the migration difficult to 
handle. The problems are further aggravated due to different languages and religions.  
 
Also important is the history of conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
Throughout the latest two centuries, there have been several wars between them and 
there have also been incidents of genocides. Politicians in both countries have used 
the history to antagonize the two people, and many Dominicans and Haitians carry a 
deep distrust towards their neighbouring country (Sandved 2004 [personal 
correspondence]). 
 
As a result of the Norwegian initiated process, three working documents were signed 
in Oslo between representatives of civil society organizations from the two countries 
in 2001 and 2002. In these agreements the parties agreed on further cooperation on 
the main issues, such as human rights, migration and deportation problems, border 
issues and economic relations. MFA, in cooperation with NCA, has played a vital 
role as a third party in facilitating this process. As a result of this process, personal 
relations across the border has developed, new perspectives on how to solve the 
conflicting issues have come up and local initiatives to improve the situation have 
been taken. A more thorough discussion of the results from the Oslo Dialogue will be 
presented in chapter 4. 
1.1.2 Research question 
In this thesis I will analyse the role Norway has played as a third party in the conflict 
preventive efforts on Hispaniola, with particular emphasis on the methods and 
strategies used by the Norwegian participants. The following research question will 
guide the analysis of MFA and NCA’s role in their peacemaking efforts in Haiti and 
the Dominican Republic: 
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 Why has the Norwegian MFA in cooperation with NCA achieved success as a 
third party in the dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic? 
 
I will argue that this is the case primarily because Norway is regarded as a neutral 
actor by both conflicting parties, and that there exist trust and confidence between the 
participants in the Oslo Dialogue and the Norwegian representatives. Second, I will 
argue that the Norwegian strategy as a facilitator for negotiations has been 
advantageous. Third, I argue that promoting leaders from the civil society to take 
responsibility for the peace process has been important, as they interact with both 
actors in the political sphere as well as enjoying legitimacy on the grassroot level. 
Fourth, the use of a problem-solving approach to the negotiations has proved to be 
fruitful. Within this approach, the parties to a conflict are encourage to not view each 
other as adversaries negotiating against one another, but rather to interpret the 
situation as one in which they have a common problem that needs to be overcome by 
taking joint decisions (Fisher et al. 1992:27). I argue that this approach can best be 
used to explain the progress in the Oslo Dialogue and that this approach has proved to 
be efficient. Other hypothesis, as the necessity of working with a long term agenda 
and the use of an NGO network for creating contacts between the conflicting parties, 
will also be investigated. The hypotheses will be presented in detail in chapter 3.4. 
1.1.3 Delimitation of this study 
As mentioned earlier, the Norwegian actors have initiated two parallel processes on 
the island. The first is an all-internal Haitian process involving the government of 
Haiti and the political opposition, and the second is a bilateral process between 
representatives of civil society organizations from both Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. The latter process will constitute the empirical basis of this study, since this 
process was given most attention by the Norwegian authorities during the initial 
phase of this study. In addition, this process provides the necessary information to 
analyze the Norwegian approach to peace. 
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 1.1.4 Theory 
First, the theoretical framework that will be elaborated to analyse the Norwegian 
involvement draws on contributions focusing on the third party role in peace 
negotiations. A third party may be an important actor in a negotiation process and I 
argue that the success of a third party depends on both their nature and the strategy 
they employ. Their nature may be defined in relation to three variables; degree of 
neutrality, legitimacy and previous relations with the conflicting parties. Furthermore, 
I portray three different strategies a third party may use in their peace making effort 
and analyze their advantages and disadvantages. I finish the theory chapter with a 
discussion over different approaches to peace building, with emphasis on the role of 
the civil society in the peace process.  
 
Second, the problem-solving approach to negotiations will constitute the theoretical 
basis that will be employed to analyze the progress in the Oslo Dialogue between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic. My starting point is a game theoretic approach to 
negotiations. This, I combine with the problem-solving approach and I argue that the 
two theoretical contributions may, in combination, be used to explain the Norwegian 
involvement on Hispaniola. According to Pillar (1983), a main issue to discuss within 
negotiation theory is how to overcome barriers to negotiate. Three different barriers; 
the exaggeration of the extent to which interests conflict, the reluctance to move first 
and the imposition of conditions to begin negotiations, will be discussed in light of 
the Norwegian involvement on Hispaniola. 
 
In order contextualize the conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, it is 
important to elaborate on the nature of the conflict between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic and its demographic, economic and cultural aspects. This discussion shows 
that Haiti is in an inferior position compared to the Dominican Republic both 
economically and in terms of the development of democratic institutions. This is also 
the main cause of the large scale migration from Haiti towards the Dominican 
Republic and an important barrier to initiate a dialogue between the two countries.   
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 1.2 Hispaniola - an island of differences 
 
Figure 1.1 Map of Hispaniola 
 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic constitute the two countries of the island of 
Hispaniola located between the Caribbean Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. Haiti 
occupies the western third of the island while the Dominican Republic constitutes the 
eastern two thirds.  
1.2.1 Demographic and economic differences 
The population on Haiti is about 7.5 million and the total land area is 27 750 square 
kilometres (CIA 2004), while in the Dominican Republic the population is about 8.8 
million and the land area is 48 730 square kilometres. The landscape on Haiti is 
predominantly mountainous. In fact the name “Haiti” comes from the Taino language 
and means “land of mountains”. When Haiti was first sighted by Columbus, it was 
more than 90% forested (Dash 2001:2). Today only 2 percent of Haiti is forested, as 
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 trees have been cut down for firewood since 70 percent of Haiti’s energy needs are 
supplied by charcoal made of wood. Haiti’s topography has often been described as 
an ecological nightmare. Deforestation and soil erosion are the major hindrances to 
rural development in Haiti. In comparison with the Dominican Republic, Haiti’s rural 
population is 35% larger, but arable land area is 40% lower (Dash 2001:3). The 
economic situation on Haiti is devastating, and about 80 percent of the rural 
population lives in poverty (World Bank 1998). Moreover, far from improving, the 
poverty situation in Haiti has been deteriorating over the past decade, concomitant 
with a rate of decline in per capita GNP of 5.2 percent a year over the 1985-95 period 
(ibid.). On the other side the Dominican Republic has had one of the fastest economic 
growth rates in the hemisphere over the past decade. Prior to 2001, the economy 
experienced ten years of annual growth exceeding 6 percent.  
 
Another indicator that confirms these differences is the Human Development Index 
(HDI)1. The Dominican Republic scores 0.738 on this index, and is ranked as the 98th 
country in the world. On the other side, Haiti scores 0.463 on the HDI, and is ranked 
as the 153rd country in the world (of 177). We can thus see that the Dominican 
Republic is far more developed than Haiti, using the HDI as an indicator. 
1.2.2 Democratic institutions and level of freedom 
Freedom House (2004) provides an annual evaluation of level of freedom in the 
world.2 The Dominican Republic has had a positive development in the Freedom 
House rating from 1994 – 2002, but a decline from 2002-2003. The score in 1994 
where 4.3 while in 2002 the score where as low as 2.2 which indicates a free country 
(ibid.). The last year however, there has been a decline in the rating, from 2.2 – 3.2, 
and this is due to corruption scandals and a growing rejection of transparency by the 
government of President Hipolito Mejia. However the score is far better than in Haiti, 
which in 2003 scored 6.6 on the Freedom House rating. The low rating in Haiti is due 
                                                 
1 This index is developed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and focuses on three measurable dimensions of human 
development: living a long and healthy life, being educated and having a decent standard of living. The index varies from 0-1, where 1 
indicates a well developed country.  
2 Freedom is measured according to two broad categories: political rights and civil liberties. Political rights enable people to participate 
freely in the political process, including through the right to vote, compete for public office, and elect representatives who have a decisive 
impact on public policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the freedoms of expression and belief, associational 
and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. The rating varies from 1-7. 
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 to ongoing political turmoil, rampant corruption and generalized social and political 
violence (ibid.). Political violence has increased dramatically the last year as parts of 
the country slipped into chaos, and supporters of former president Aristide battled 
opponents on a regular basis in the streets of Port au Prince.  
1.3 A history of conflict 
Ever since Christopher Columbus sat foot on the island in 1492, it has had a history 
of conflicts and disputes (Kvamme 2001). The Spanish conquered the island and 
made the local population, the Arawacan-indians, work in the goldmines. Spain 
controlled the whole island until France in 1697 occupied the western part of the 
island (now Haiti). In earlier history, Hispaniola became a mirror of European 
politics; when France and Spain were engaging in war on the European continent, the 
colonists also fought on Hispaniola (Sagas 1994). 
 
Inspired by the French revolution, about 100 000 slaves of African origin started a 
rebellion in 1791. This ultimately led to the independence of Haiti in January 1804 as 
the first free country in Latin America (Hartlyn 1998:26, Ferguson 1988:11). After 
this rebellion, the Haitians seized control over the whole island until 1809, when 
Spain got back their part of the island. The Spanish colonists reinstated slavery and 
intervened in Haiti in order to kidnap Haitians to work as slaves in the Spanish part of 
the island. In 1821 the Haitian president Boyer took advantage of a revolt against 
Spanish rule in the capital Santo Domingo by invading and annexing it. The island 
remained under Haitian control until 1844, when the eastern part proclaimed 
independence as the Dominican Republic (Hartlyn 1998:27, Ferguson 1988:16). The 
conflicts between the two countries continued during the 1840s and 1850s. In 1848 
France recognized the Dominican Republic as an independent state, leading the 
Haitians to feel their independence threatened. Arguing that the treaty was an attack 
upon Haiti’s own security, the Haitian president Soulogue invaded the new republic 
in an attempt to occupy it before the French could even ratify the negotiated treaty 
(Krohn-Hansen 1995:40). The Haitians seized one frontier community after another, 
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 but when the decisive battle took place, Soulogue was defeated and forced to 
withdraw his armies. In 1855 the Dominicans initiated the negotiation of a treaty of 
friendship, commerce and navigation with the United States, which again produced 
Haitian fears. The presence of the USA, a principal pro-slavery power, which also 
had struggled against the world’s first black republic from its inception, on 
Hispaniola’s soil would undermine Haiti’s security (Krohn-Hansen 1995:41). Once 
again president Soulogue invaded the Dominican territory, but again he had to 
withdraw his forces. The period after 1855 was characterised by internal conflict, 
political instability and international control over the economy in both countries, with 
Haiti as the stronger one measured in both economic and military terms. The threat 
from Haiti played a significant role in the forming of Dominican politics, and made 
the Dominican leaders engage in efforts to place their territory under the protection of 
either a European state or the United States (Krohn-Hansen 1995:44). In this effort 
they succeeded in 1861 as the Spanish government re-annexed the Dominican 
Republic.  
 
Among the conflicting issues in this period, was the question of the demarcation of 
the Dominican-Haitian border. After the Dominican independence in 1844, a major 
objective of Dominican rulers had been to retrieve a sizable section of the Haitian-
Dominican borderlands which had been lost to Haiti in 1794 (Krohn-Hansen 
1995:45). Negotiations between the two countries were held in order to reach an 
agreement concerning their common border. The first agreement was reached in 
1874, but because of different interpretations of this treaty from the two countries the 
dispute was not finally settled until the Treaty of 1936. This treaty was signed by 
President Trujillo and President Vincent, and had its origin in a treaty ratified in 1929 
that supposedly set a delineated border and settled long-time disputes (Shafer 2001). 
1.3.1 US Occupation – Hispaniola’s geopolitical importance 
Dissatisfaction with the Spanish control, the so-called war of Restoration which 
started as a rebellion in 1863, led to a new period of independence in the Dominican 
Republic until USA occupied it in 1916. A year earlier, the US had invaded Haiti due 
to the fact that the US had begun to recognise that Haiti’s proximity to the Windward 
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 Passage gave the country a strategic importance (Kvamme 2001, Ferguson 1988:24). 
The Americans pulled out of Haiti in 1934, as the occupation was proving costly and 
Haiti’s strategic importance had diminished. They left behind an improved 
infrastructure, but Haiti was still poverty-stricken and overpopulated. In the 
Dominican Republic, the US government was concerned that the revolutions in the 
Caribbean posed a threat to US national security and took the position that only by 
managing the political and financial affairs of the region’s countries could the 
continued political instability in the area be suppressed. Between 1916 and 1924, the 
Dominican Republic was under US control. However, by 1924 the American 
situation had changed considerably, and these changes affected US policy overseas. 
The World War I was over and the USA, which had previously feared German 
attacks on the Panama Canal without an American military presence in the 
Dominican Republic, was considerably less concerned with the republic’s strategic 
importance.  
1.3.2 Conflict and dictatorship on Hispaniola 
The present-day economical and political conflicts on Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic are closely linked to the recent history of the countries, particularly the 
dictatorship years. The changes the US occupation brought about were superficial and 
short-lived. A lot of the infrastructure, as roads, ports, hospitals was soon to fall in to 
disrepair and for the mass of Haitian peasantry, life continued as a struggle for 
survival as it was before the occupation (Ferguson 1988). After the Americans pulled 
out of Haiti, many Haitians were again obliged to seek work in the sugarcane fields in 
the Dominican Republic. This increased migration created a new fear in the 
Dominican Republic, and led to one of the worst massacres in Haiti’s history, as the 
Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo in 1937 ordered his police army and military to 
eliminate all illegal Haitians on Dominican ground (Sagas 1994, Krohn-Hansen 
1995:53, Kvamme 2001). The historians disagree on how many were killed in the 
massacre, but the numbers vary form 4000-6000 and up to as much as 25,000 
(Krohn-Hansen 1995). 
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 Trujillo 
Trujillo became president in the Dominican Republic in 1930. He had worked his 
way up through the police force (Krohn Hansen 1995:55). As he advanced in rank, 
Trujillo used his growing power as a local commander to make a fortune arranging 
deals involving the purchase of food, clothing and supplies for the soldiers. Later, 
when he became president, he shaped the state almost as a private business (Krohn-
Hansen 1995:55, Kvamme 2001). For example, when one of his companies showed a 
loss, he would sell it to the state at profit. When the same company recuperated its 
losses, he would buy it back again. Furthermore, he created a series of state 
monopolies, to eliminate competition. By buying and controlling several enterprises, 
he became the richest man in the country already by the end of this first president 
term (ibid., Hartlyn 1998:43). Regarding the relation to Haiti, the border became 
closed after the 1937 massacre, with exception of the importation of Haitian workers. 
This situation lasted until the end of the Trujillo regime. In 1941 the government 
launched a major program of Dominicanization on the frontier, and the countryside, 
which had formerly been inhabited by Haitians, was repopulated by Dominican 
families. In late 1920s and 1930s and also during the Trujillo era, the Dominican 
Republic passed Haiti measured in economic development. Haiti suffered under 
economic hardship because of food and import shortages due to the personal 
corruption of the former presidents in the country. 
The Duvalier family 
When Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier became president in Haiti in 1957, he and later 
his son, Jean Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, were about to rule the country as their 
private property for about 30 years. The story of Francois Duvalier’s presidency is 
that of the transformation of a mild-mannered country doctor into a semi-divine 
absolutist leader (Dash 2001:16). The word “Duvalierist” has become synonymous 
with “dictatorial” attesting to the nature of the dictatorship that Duvalier’s presidency 
created between 1957 and 1971. Duvalier consolidated state power by first of all 
neutralizing all the institutions in civil society that could pose a threat to his regime. 
Schools, churches, trade unions, universities, and the media were all undermined as 
priests were expelled, journalists tortured, and intellectuals forced into exile (Dash 
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 2001:16). One of his most dramatic strategies was the creation of a civilian militia, 
officially called the Volontaires de la Securité (Volunteers for National Security) but 
popularly known as the Tonton Macoutes, as a countervailing force to keep the army 
in check (Ferguson 1988:40-41). This civilian militia was drawn from a wide cross-
section of Haitian society, providing a network of intelligence gathering and 
nationwide intimidation of any potential opposition. It was this manipulation of state 
violence that protected the Duvalier regime from both internal destabilization as well 
as external invasion. Even though Duvalier deliberately used his ideology of a racial 
and national mystique to create a hermit state that thrived on isolation, Haiti was still 
dependent of outside support or at least approval from the United states (Dash 
2001:17). The United States had some difficulty supporting a government that by 
1961 had abandoned all pretence of democracy and by 1964 had declared Duvalier 
president for life under a new constitution. However, in the atmosphere of the Cold 
War, Duvalier used his anti-leftist stance to both appease Washington and liquidate 
any local opposition.  
 
When Duvalier died in 1971, the United States supported Haiti to ensure a smooth 
transition of power from Papa Doc to his son, Jean Claude Duvalier or “Baby Doc” as 
he was called. “Baby Doc” claimed at the outset that he would lead an economic 
revolution in Haiti, but he generally continued the initiatives of his father even though 
there was a relaxation in the use of state terror (Dash 2001:19). The “economic 
revolution” really meant attracting foreign capital, but despite an increase in foreign 
investment, first and foremost in assembly plants using cheap, non- unionized labour, 
and an atmosphere of economic liberalism, little real development came to Haiti. The 
assembly industry could not on its own transform Haiti, since most of the population 
in the countryside did not benefit from increased employment in this area. The 
disparities in income and amenities between the capital and rural areas only grew 
larger. Desperation drove the poverty stricken peasantry to migrate to the United 
States, Bahamas and the Dominican Republic, in the latter instance to work under the 
supervision of the Dominican military in near-slavery conditions on the sugar 
plantations (Dash 2001:20). By the mid 1980s the economic situation had grown 
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 progressively worse. This could be partly explained as a result of persistent droughts, 
a rapacious state and the crisis of a country that exported little and depended 
massively on foreign assistance. Also the tourism went into irreversible decline when 
the U.S. Centre for Disease Control declared that Haitians were a high risk group for 
the HIV virus.  A large scale protest against the government in 1986 forced “Baby 
Doc” to flee the country, and he brought with him about 500 million American 
dollars to France, where he lives today (Kvamme 2001). 
1.4 Present day instability and conflict 
1.4.1 Political instability on Haiti 
The period after Baby Doc fled the country was characterized by chaos, instability 
and military coups. The catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide won the election in 
1990 by a large majority (Dash 2001:24). But after half a year as president, he was 
thrown out after a military coup under the leadership of General Raol Cédras, and had 
to flee to Venezuela and later the USA. The Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the US immediately condemned the coup, calling for economic sanctions. But the 
embargo was proving to be ineffectual, and this, combined with the flow of Haitian 
refugees to the US, forced the United Nations and the US to make firmer efforts to 
end the deadlock. In 1994, the former American president, Jimmy Carter, arrived in 
Haiti to begin negotiations with Cédras (ibid.). These talks paved the way for an 
unchallenged deployment of US forces in Haiti, rather than a combative invasion. 
The US forces arrived on September 19, 1994, and reinstated Aristide as president. 
However, the return of Aristide did not bring any immediate solution to Haiti’s 
problems. Haiti’s recovery was slowed down partly due to international embargo and 
military repression, but also because Aristide no longer was the one who was driven 
into exile. He was now more of a politician than a priest with a firm political 
ideology, and he accomplished little else that the abolition of the Haitian army in 
1995 (Dash 2001:25). The real difficulties, as to reinstate an economy after several 
years of turmoil have up until now failed to be accomplished, and ideological 
contradictions have arisen between Aristid’s Lavalas party and international aid 
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 organizations. These organizations have put together millions of dollars in aid based 
on a restructuring and liberalization of the Haitian economy.  
 
The failure to boost the economy along with the political crisis stemming from the 
fraudulent legislative elections in 2000 has created severe political instability in Haiti. 
The Aristide opposition has grown, and in 2003 and 2004 different groups from 
opposing parties, gangs and nongovernmental organisations arranged a number of 
demonstrations calling for Aristide’s resignation as president. Between September 
2003 and March 2004 more than 300 people have been killed in this low scale 
rebellion (USA Today 20.03.04). Aristide and his loyalists managed to stay in power 
for a decade, but the administration was dogged by charges of human rights 
violations, corruption and widespread poverty among the Haitian people. The revolt 
against him was executed by former military personnel under the command of Guy 
Phillipe, the former police chief who also made an attempt to overthrow Aristide in 
2001 (Valenzuela 2004). Aristide was flown out of Haiti on February 29, 2004, and 
the US announced plans to deploy troops as international peacekeepers. His departure 
was described by the US as a resignation, but Aristide stated that he had been 
kidnapped and forced to leave by the US (ibid.). 
 
The old political culture based on divisiveness and inability to compromise, and the 
lack of genuine concern for the mass of the Haitian people still haunts Haitian politics 
(Dash 2001:26). In addition more and more Haitians wish to leave their country. A lot 
of them try to flee the country by boat to either Cuba or the United States, where they 
normally either die on their way or they are sent back by the US Navy forces. This 
has led to large migration flows to the Dominican Republic, as this is the easiest way 
out of Haiti.   
1.4.2 The migration problem – a Haiti-Dominican source of conflict 
Reliance on Haitian labour in the Dominican sugar industry continued after the USA 
withdrew from the Dominican Republic in 1924, and Haitians became an exploited, 
yet stable supply of workers (Fletcher et al 2002:12, Ferguson 1988:65). Connected 
to the nationalization of the sugar industry in the 1950’s, Trujillo formalized Haiti’s 
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 supply of labourers. In 1952, Trujillo signed the “Convenio” (eng. Convention) as the 
first bilateral labour agreement with Haiti, which contracted the Haitian government 
to provide thousands of Haitian workers to perform as cheap labour in the Dominican 
cane fields (Ferguson 1988:66-67). The agreement remained in effect until 1986, 
when “Baby Doc” relinquished power and fled the country. The Haitians who arrived 
to work in the Dominican Republic were subject to strict regulations. They were 
restricted to live in so-called “Bateyes”, which is the communities on the sugar cane 
plantations, and were not allowed to leave these areas. In addition salaries were low 
and the payment was based on the weight of cane cut and it was not unusual for 
scales to be unfairly rigged against the labourers (Fletcher et al. 2002:13).  
 
Political instability and economic deterioration have continued to affect Haiti since 
the end of the Duvalier regime. As the economic disparities between the two 
countries continue to grow, more and more Haitians are willing to leave behind their 
home in search for employment in the Dominican Republic. In the mid 1990s, official 
estimates of the number of Haitians living permanently in the Dominican Republic 
were between 400 000 and 500 000, but unofficial numbers says as much as 1 
million. They are mainly employed in the agricultural sector, where most of them 
work on the sugar plantations, but also in other sectors as rice- and coffee plantations 
and in the construction business. The Haitians face bad working conditions, with low 
payment and long hours. The living conditions of Haitians are similarly bleach; most 
“bateyes” do not have potable water, sanitation or medical and social services 
(Fletcher et al 2002:13). This, combined with the constant fear of being sent back to 
Haiti by the Dominican government, makes the living conditions way below 
standards according to international laws. International standards regarding judicial 
guarantees and protection apply to the determination of legal status and on how to 
deport Haitians in the Dominican Republic (ibid.). Article 8 (the right to fair trade) 
and article 25 (the right to judicial protection) of the American Convention establish 
minimal due process protection that apply to deportation proceedings. 
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 Deportation 
In order to understand the major conflicting issue, it is necessary with a description of 
the deportations of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descendents living in the 
Dominican Republic. Despite the Dominican’s reliance on Haitian labour, the 
Dominican government has initiated a large scale expulsion of Haitians from the 
country on three occasions the last decade. The first of these occurred in 1991, when 
about 35000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descendents were expelled (OAS 
country report 1999), with many more leaving on their own to avoid military 
harassment and abuse (Fletcher et al 2002:5). This mass expulsion was authorized by 
Decree 233-91; issued by president Balaguer, and contented that all undocumented 
Haitians under age 16 and over age 60 should be deported from the Dominican 
Republic. The Dominican Presidential election in 1996 brought with it a rise in anti-
Haitian rhetoric and propaganda from the Balaguer administration. During this 
election, there were reported several incidents of state officials rounding up Haitians 
and Dominicans of Haitian descendents and destroying their documents (Fletcher et 
al 2002:6). The opposition leader in the Dominican Republic, Leonel Fernandez, 
unseated Balaguer and took office in August of 1996. Despite Fernandez’ rhetoric 
about improving Dominican-Haitian relations, a second campaign of mass expulsions 
began shortly after his inauguration. Between November 1996 and January 1997, an 
estimated 15 000 Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian descendent were expelled, and 
the expulsions continued to rise and an estimated 25 000 deportations occurred 
between January and March 1997.  
 
In 1999 the Dominican government began for the third time that decade collective 
mass expulsions (Fletcher et al 2002:6). Reports indicate that officials 
indiscriminately arrested and expelled those suspected of being Haitian, targeting 
mainly individuals with black skin, including those who had never been on Haiti and 
spoke only Spanish, and expelled them to Haiti. Similar to past episodes, authorities 
did not afford individuals the opportunity to prove their Dominican citizenship or 
legal status, and those expelled were unable to contact their families or collect their 
belongings before being forced from the country.  
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The wave of expulsions subsided in December 1999, after the Dominican government 
signed a bilateral agreement with Haiti that established new procedures and standards 
for deportation. This protocol of understanding, which is called the Protocol of 1999, 
regulates the treatment of deportees. In that document, the Dominican Republic 
agreed to improve its deportation procedures in several ways. Specifically, the 
Dominican government promised: a) not to deport Haitians at night or during the 
afternoon on Sundays or holidays; b) to avoid separating nuclear families (parents 
and young children); c) to deport Haitians only through the Jimaní, Dajabón, Elías 
Piña, and Pedernales border crossings, rather than the country's less accessible 
crossings; d) to allow deportees to collect their personal belongings and retain their 
identity documents; e) to provide each deportee with a copy of his or her order of 
deportation and; f) to give the Haitian authorities notice of repatriations (Human 
Rights Watch 2002). Yet, even after signing this protocol, reports continued that the 
Dominican government persisted in expelling Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian 
descendent. While the Dominican government has the sovereign right to regulate 
immigration, the manner in which it removes individuals from its borders is a human 
rights issue. It is a prohibition against collective expulsions in international laws, 
including article 22(9) of the American Convention (Fletcher et al 2002:14). This 
article includes that states are obligated to “judge each case of expulsion or 
deportation individually” (ibid). This has failed to be done in the waves of expulsions 
described above and therefore, Dominican immigration policy and practise has been 
subject to international scrutiny.  
1.4.3 The border issue and economic relations 
Both the Haitian and the Dominican population living in the border area suffer from 
conditions that include extreme poverty and a lack of basic social services (Oslo 
Dialogue 2002). In addition there is a series of serious problems connected to the 
traffic of persons and commercials across the border. In addition to the illegal 
migration, there are a large amount of smuggling of goods such as groceries, vehicles, 
weapon, clothing and others. This has led to several incidents where the military and 
the police have used violence against individuals and communities in the border area 
 22
 (ibid.). Another great problem in the borderlands is the severe deforestation that has 
taken place over the latest decades. This problem occurs on both sides of the border, 
and affects in a negative manner both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Although 
there have been several international agencies and organizations working in this area, 
their efforts have not yet led to the desired results.  
1.4.4 Antihaitianismo in the Dominican Republic 
There is an intimate link between race, culture and politics in the Caribbean, 
particularly in the former colonies of Spain. In the Dominican Republic, the elites 
have created racist, hegemonic ideologies to promote their power and privileges over 
several decades (Sagas 2000: preface). Antihaitianismo ideology combines a legacy 
of racist Spanish colonial neutrality, nineteenth century racial theories and twentieth 
century cultural neoracism into a web of anti Haitian attitudes, racial stereotypes and 
historical distortions (ibid). A range of criteria are used by Dominicans to distinguish 
between themselves and the Haitians. Important measures are skin colour, language 
and in some cases the way of dressing (Krohn-Hansen 1995:70). Furthermore, 
Dominicans classify themselves as having catholic, Hispanic and light skinned roots 
and they tend to demonize Haitians as Africans and therefore blacks. The Haitians are 
not only despised, but also associated with destructive power and hence danger as a 
result of their connection to voodoo (ibid.). This hegemonic ideology has had a 
significant effect on Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic, but it has also 
traditionally been employed as an ideological weapon to subdue the black and 
mulatto Dominican lower classes and maintain their political position (Sagas 
2000:preface).  
 
This antihaitianismo ideology has consequences both for the Haitian migrants living 
in the Dominican Republic, as well as for the Haitian-Dominican relationship (Sagas 
2000:122). The leaders from both Haiti and the Dominican Republic have publicly 
expressed their desire to enhance the current status of the Haitian-Dominican 
relationship, but this desire mostly remains as only words without any action. A 
recent example was when Aristide, in an effort to improve his government’s 
popularity, tried to create nationalist feelings among the Haitian people, by 
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 denouncing antihaitianismo and human right abuses in the Dominican Republic at the 
United Nations. As a response to this, former president in Dominican Republic, 
Balaguer, began massive repatriation of illegal Haitians living in the Dominican 
Republic (ibid). Actions like these have tended to exacerbate the already tense nature 
of the relationship and provide little fertile ground for a new dialogue (Sagas 
2000:123-124). Under the leadership of René Prevál in Haiti and Leonel Fernández in 
the Dominican Republic, a joint bilateral commission (La Commición Mixta) was 
created to draft new agreements. However, most of these agreements seem to have 
been of secondary importance, and the issue of Haitian migration still remains 
unsolved, as both sides have major differences (ibid).  
 
It is within this context of conflict and tension that the current attempts at peace 
negotiations has to be understood. In chapter four I will more precisely define the 
conflict and analyze the Norwegian involvement in light of the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter three. In the next chapter I will elaborate the research strategy of 
this study. 
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 2. Methodology 
The starting point is the case study as a methodological approach. First I will present 
this approach and compare it with other methods and evaluate it in light of different 
types of data. Then, I will discuss the case study approach in relation to my own 
fieldwork. 
2.1 Methodological approach 
2.1.1 Case study 
The case to be investigated in this thesis is the Norwegian involvement on 
Hispaniola. Based on my research question, different aspects of this involvement will 
be analyzed. The history of the two countries will be relevant in terms of 
understanding the relation between them, but my main focus will be the three 
meetings held in Oslo in 2001 and 2002 (referred to as the Oslo Dialogue) and the 
activities and changes that have taken place as a result of these meetings. 
 
I have chosen the case study, as presented in Yin (2003), as a methodological starting 
point and framework for this study: 
 
“In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when “how” or “why” 
questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, 
and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context. Such explanatory case studies also can be complemented by two other 
types – exploratory and descriptive case studies.” (Yin 2003:1) 
 
The case study is one of several methodological approaches that may be used in the 
study of a phenomenon. According to Yin (2003:5), it separates itself from other 
methods, as experiments, quantitative surveys, archive analysis and historical studies  
as a function of three conditions; a) the type of research question, b) the control an 
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 investigator has over actual behavioural events, and c) the focus on contemporary as 
opposed to historical phenomena. The methods are not mutually exclusive, as several 
of them might be relevant related to the study of a phenomenon. However, in some 
situations, one single method may be advantageous compared to the other methods. 
Consequently, the case study approach is well suited when how- and why-questions 
are raised on a contemporary phenomenon in which the researcher have little or non 
control over (ibid.). 
  
The case study considers situations where there are more interesting variables than 
number of observations, and therefore it is dependent on several sources of 
information, as well as the already developed theoretical statements in order to 
organize the data collection and the analysis. With this definition as a basis, the case 
study approach as a research strategy constitutes an all-embracing method that 
involves determined approaches to data collection and analysis. 
 
Theories are important within the case study approach (Yin 2003:28-33). In the first 
place, they are important in forming the research strategy prior to the data collection. 
This does not involve a grand theory within the social science, but rather theoretical 
statements that reflect the content of the study and that control the collection of data. 
Second, theory is important in the generalization of the results achieved through the 
case study. This is not statistical generalization of a population based on conclusions 
from a sample, but rather an analytical generalization, where the already developed 
theories are used as a framework for comparing the case study findings. 
 
In this case I have focused on theories within the problem solving approach to 
negotiations. These theories are important in understanding the dynamics of the Oslo 
Dialogue and its progress. Also important are theories about the third party role in 
negotiations, especially theories that reflect the nature of the third party and different 
strategies third parties may use in a negotiation. 
 
 26
 2.1.2 Data collection and triangulation 
One of the advantages using a case study approach is the use of several sources of 
information (Yin 2003:99). This might be different types of documentation, such as 
administrative reports, other studies of the same phenomena, archival records, 
interviews, direct observation or participant observation. The use of different sources 
of information together will give a higher degree of precision when studying a 
phenomenon (Yin 2003:100). 
Interviews and informants 
Within the framework of a case study approach, emphasizing qualitative method, I 
have based this study on two main techniques of data collection; interviews and 
different types of documentation.  
 
There are different types of interviews. It is common to make a distinction between 
an interview and a conversation. The difference between them is how much room that 
is given within the framework of the question. Using interviews, the questions are 
made in advance and they demand certain answers. Using a conversation, a theme is 
given, and the respondent may talk about what he/she wants to talk about. The 
interviewer may occasionally ask questions to follow up the development of the 
conversation.  
 
Yin (2003:89-90) refers to the conversation as an open interview, where one can ask 
key respondents about facts over a topic, but also about their opinion on different 
events. In some situations, one can also ask the respondent to present his/her own 
understanding of different topics, and this may be used as basis for further 
investigation. In these cases, the respondent will have a role as an informant, which is 
a person who does not only give an understanding of the theme, but also assists in 
finding other sources of information. Another type of interview, identified by Yin 
(2003:90-91) is the focused interview. These interviews last for only a short period of 
time. The questions may still be shaped as open and take form as conversational, but 
it is more likely that the interviewer follows certain questions more rigid than in the 
open interview. 
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In this study, different types of interviews have been used. The shape of the interview 
depended on both who I interviewed and also what kind of information I was 
searching for. An interview guide was used in all of the interviews. This guide was 
prepared prior to the fieldwork, but was constantly changed during the fieldwork as 
new questions, themes and perspectives came up. The questions were mostly either 
open or focused. When I interviewed I usually started with wide questions, while 
during the interview the question became more precise, related to themes that came 
up and to the interview guide. Questions about concrete information were adjusted to 
each informant in order to receive the desired information.  
Triangulation 
In this case study, I have mainly used two types of triangulation. As data triangulation 
I have used both interviews as well as different types of documents, in order to 
provide an overall picture of different aspects regarding the Norwegian involvement 
on Hispaniola. Especially important documents are studies about the human rights 
situation in the country and the three working documents that have been produced in 
the Oslo Dialogue. Related to informant triangulation, different persons with different 
roles have been interviewed to give a broader understanding of the Norwegian 
involvement. I have interviewed persons from both countries and also the Norwegian 
representatives. In the next chapter I will describe my fieldwork, and portray more 
specific the sources of information that have been used. 
2.2 Data collection 
2.2.1 The fieldwork 
The fieldwork took place in May 2003. I spent about 3 weeks in Santo Domingo (the 
capital of the Dominican Republic) and about 1 week in Port au Prince (the capital of 
Haiti). The reason for staying longer in the Dominican Republic was partly due to the 
high expenses in Port au Prince together with the security situation and partly due to 
the fact that I was able to complete a lot of interviews in a short period of time.  
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 Prior to the fieldwork, I had already established contact with the coordinators of the 
to countries’ delegations in the Oslo Dialogue, when they were in Norway in 
February the same year. This was Carlos Pimentel Rivera from the Dominican 
Republic and Garaudy Laguerre from Haiti. C. Pimentel Rivera is a professor in 
sociology, now working for an NGO called Pro Carribe, an organization working 
with Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic.  G. Laguerre is director of an 
educational institute in Port au Prince, called ISPOS (Institute Superieur de Politique 
e Sosiologi). Both C. Pimentel Rivera and G. Laguerre are resourceful persons, with a 
wide range of contacts at different levels of the society. They provided me with vital 
information and assisted me in arranging interviews with other participants in the 
Oslo Dialogue as well as high ranked politicians and represents of the media. In 
addition they assisted me with practical problems such as transport and 
accommodation. 
Interviews in Santo Domingo 
In Santo Domingo, my main informant was C. Pimentel Rivera. He is the coordinator 
of the Dominican delegation in the Oslo Dialogue and is responsible for the follow up 
of the agreements reached in Oslo. Therefore, he has been important both in terms of 
providing me with facts, as well as in providing me with information on how the 
Dominicans involved in the process works to implement the agreements. He has also 
been an important informant in terms of providing me with information on the 
Dominican position on the different conflicting issues.  
 
Another important informant in Santo Domingo was L. Mota King. He is the leader  
of an evangelic organization cooperating with the NCA and has been a participant in 
the Oslo Dialogue. Mota King is also responsible for a dialogue established between 
different church communities on both sides of the island, a process that runs parallel 
to the Oslo Dialogue (also financed through the Norwegian MFA). I met with Mota 
King several times during my stay in Santo Domingo. I interviewed him once, but I 
also had several informal conversations. These conversations were important, as I got 
an insight in the political system in Dominican Republic, and in understanding the 
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 underlying causes of the conflict. Mota King also provided me with transport and 
arranged interviews with other actors involved in the process. 
 
In addition, I interviewed T. Isaac, a bishop that has been working with Dominican-
Haitian relations for many years, and who is a participant in the church dialogue. He 
provided me with useful information of the history between the two countries, and 
gave me an insight in how the relation is at present. Furthermore I interviewed R. 
Carvajal, who is the director of Pro Carribe and a participant in the Oslo Dialogue. 
 
During my stay in Santo Domingo I also participated as an observer in a meeting 
between Norwegian representatives from MFA and NCA, and Dominicans involved 
in the Norwegian initiated process. This meeting gave me vital insight in the dynamic 
of the process, and on future plans. After the meeting I was able to have informal 
conversation with several participants in the process. 
Interviews in Port au Prince 
In Port au Prince, G. Laguerre, the coordinator of the Haitian delegation in the Oslo 
Dialogue, was my main informant. He was an important informant in several 
respects. First of all he possesses a lot of information about both the political 
dynamics in Haiti and about the relation between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
Second, as a coordinator of the Haitian delegation he has been part of the dialogue 
since its very beginning and he has been responsible in selecting people to participate 
in the dialogue. In addition to a focused interview, I had several informal 
conversations with G. Laguerre about the process and the Haitian-Dominican 
relation.  
 
G. Laguerre did also arrange interviews with several other Haitians that are involved 
in the process as well as high ranked politicians and the leader of the largest press 
association on Haiti. These were N.Gregoire, a woman working in the Haitian 
Ministry of Foreign affairs. She is a member of the official Mixed Commission 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and she has been a participant in the Oslo 
Dialogue. Furthermore I interviewed P. Pierre-Antoine who is the director of the 
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 official migration office in Haiti. J.C. Delva was also an important informant. He is 
the leader of the biggest press association on Haiti (Associacion Haitien de 
Journalistique (AHJ)). In addition I interviewed D. Lemaere, a lawyer now working 
for a women’s association in the border area between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. She has also been participating in the first and the last meeting held in 
Oslo. 
Interviews in Norway 
In addition to these interviews, I have also interviewed some of the Norwegian 
representatives in the dialogue. These are P. Skauen and I.Sandved at the NCA and 
K. Hoem Langsholdt at the MFA. These interviews have been important in 
understanding strategies and methods used, as well as the motivation for Norway to 
initiate such a process. Furthermore, they have been important to understand how the 
Oslo Dialogue has been carried out in practice and to understand the progress in the 
dialogue.  
2.2.2 Secondary sources 
In order to investigate the research question, I have in addition to interviews, used 
different types of secondary sources. The large amounts of literature related to the 
history of the two countries have been used in order to increase the reliability. 
Related to the present conflict the range of literature is more limited. However, some 
reports regarding the human rights situation on the island do exist. In this section I 
have mainly based my analysis on these reports in addition to the three working 
papers that have been produced in the Oslo Dialogue. Personal interviews with 
participants in the dialogue and the Norwegian representatives from NCA and MFA 
have also been important in this regard. 
 
The use of secondary sources is not necessarily based on its reliability as a source, 
and it is therefore important to use them critically (Yin 2003:87). The purpose 
regarding the use of secondary sources in this study has been to explore the main 
features related to the theme. When doing a case study, the use of secondary sources 
is mainly useful when comparing and collating with other sources of information. In 
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 this thesis, secondary sources have mainly been used to understand the development 
in the Haitian-Dominican relation since the colonial period, and to understand the 
dynamics of the present situation. I have used different sources of documentation in 
order to provide a more precise picture of central aspects related to the themes 
discussed. At the same time, secondary sources have been used in order to verify 
spelling of names and organizations, as well as other information that have been 
mentioned in interviews. 
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 3. Theoretical framework 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on two different traditions within 
negotiation theory. First, the theoretical framework employed to analyze the 
Norwegian involvement draws on contributions focusing on the third party role in 
peace negotiations. Second, the problem-solving approach to negotiations will 
constitute the theoretical basis that will be employed to analyze the progress in the 
Oslo Dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Although the different 
theoretical contributions normally are meant for negotiations between state leaders or 
entrusted agents of the state in already erupted conflicts, I will argue that these 
theories also are applicable to negotiations between representatives of civil society 
organizations in conflict preventive efforts.   
 
Before discussing negotiation theory, it is necessary to briefly present the Norwegian 
model to peace as it is described by the Norwegian MFA. This will provide the 
necessary basis for both the theoretical discussion and the analysis of the Norwegian 
involvement on Hispaniola. After this discussion, different approaches to negotiation 
will be elaborated, with particular focus on a simple game theoretic model and the 
problem-solving approach. Lastly, the third party role in negotiations will be 
explicitly discussed, with particular focus on the nature of the third party and the 
strategies they may employ. 
3.1 The Norwegian model to peace 
After the end of the cold war there has been a change in Norwegian foreign policy 
(Sørbø et al 1998). While previously, the main focus was on humanitarian aid, there 
is now a closer link between peace efforts, humanitarian and long term aid and the 
promotion of democracy and human rights in collaboration with actors outside the 
MFA. These changes are, according to the MFA, due to the realisation that internal 
conflicts as well as inter-state conflicts undermine efforts to protect human rights and 
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 they hamper economic and social development. In most of its conflict interventions, 
the Norwegian government has played a role as a facilitator for parties in conflict. 
One of the main tasks has been to create a good environment for negotiations. MFA 
points out that Norway hardly can be anything else than a facilitator, as the country is 
too small to be able to put economic or political pressure upon the parties in order to 
make agreements. It is first when the parties themselves are willing to negotiate that 
Norway can act as a facilitator in peace negotiations, creating the right conditions, 
finding meeting places and work as a convenor of information between the parties in 
conflict. According to MFAs own webpage (MFA 2004), the Norwegian model to 
peace is based on 4 pillars, all based on the experience of Norwegian NGOs from 
emergency situations and catastrophes over several years. It is important to underline 
that this is not a model as defined within a political science approach, but rather a 
collective term for certain aspects of the approach used by the Norwegian MFA in 
conflict situations. Furthermore, the Norwegian model to peace, must not be confused 
with a related concept; the Norwegian model. While the Norwegian model describes 
the relation between the state, humanitarian organizations and research environments, 
the Norwegian model to peace is related to a foreign policy based on the advantages a 
small country may possess (Tvedt 2004:57). 
 
The first pillar in the Norwegian model to peace is the close relationship between the 
Norwegian state and the humanitarian NGOs (The Norwegian model). This 
relationship is based on trust and flexibility in order to give efficient help in crisis and 
conflicts all over the world. This is a kind of cooperation that has been developing 
during several decades, especially within the field of humanitarian aid. Still, this 
cooperation is mainly based upon, and depending on, boundaries of loyalty as there 
exist few other control mechanisms. MFA cooperates with all sorts of humanitarian 
NGOs, but their main cooperation is with the so called “big five”. These are the 
Norwegian Red Cross (NRC), the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Save the 
Children, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) and the Norwegian Council for Refugees 
(NCR). The cooperation is either initiated by MFA, or the NGOs themselves contact 
MFA for political and economic support for various projects. 
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The second pillar is the image that Norway has created as a country engaging in 
peacemaking efforts. Because Norway is a small country without any superpower 
interests, and has experience with peace work, few countries object to Norway 
involving itself with aid and peace efforts. In fact, in many of the Norwegian 
involvements it is the parties themselves, or international actors that have contacted 
the Norwegian government for assistance. The fact that Norway do not have any 
hegemonic interests, is an important attribute for a third party in a negotiation. I argue 
that it is easier for a small country like Norway to gain trust from conflicting parties, 
than it would have been for a larger country. 
 
The third pillar is the network of key persons in organizations, research institutes and 
foreign affairs service. This network has been especially important in offering 
untraditional channels for negotiation outside the official. The NGOs often have an 
expertise on issues and/or region in conflict. As the representatives of NGOs have 
personal relations with people at different levels of the society, both high ranked 
officials, people at the mid-level of the society such as leaders of local NGOs and 
research institutions as well as on the grass root level, the Norwegian state may lean 
on these networks in order to better understand the conflicts as well as to facilitate the 
process of creating contact between the conflicting parties.  
 
The fourth pillar is the willingness of the Norwegian government to work with a long 
term agenda. After agreements have been reached it is normally necessary with 
economic support in order to rebuild democracy, institutions and infrastructure. As 
peace efforts normally are comprehensive, multifaceted, time-consuming processes, a 
third party should have a long-term perspective on its own involvement (Sørbø et al 
1998:6). An agreement does not necessarily signal a lasting peace. Clinching an 
agreement to end violence is often just one step in a broader process of conflict de-
escalation. The implementation of an agreement is often riddled with uncertainty, and 
may include demobilisation, repatriation of refugees, economic reconstruction and/or 
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 elections. The MFA recognises the necessity of working with a long term agenda, and 
this attribute is important within the framework of the Norwegian model to peace.  
 
This brief presentation of the Norwegian model to peace placed in context with the 
theoretical discussion below, constitute the foundation for the elaboration of 
hypotheses to be investigated in the analysis of the Norwegian involvement on 
Hispaniola.  
3.2 Negotiation Theory 
3.2.1 Conceptual discussion 
Early work on negotiation processes tended to be framed within the realist tradition 
of international politics, with its emphasis on state-to-state diplomacy (Hopmann 
1996:24). However, more recent focus on theories of interdependence within the 
liberal paradigm of international politics, as well as new demands placed on 
negotiation theory by the changing nature of post cold war have contributed to a 
substantial reconceptualization of the international negotiation theory. In this new 
light, negotiations are increasingly viewed as a tool in which conflicts may be 
resolved in such a way as to produce natural benefits for the parties rather than 
exclusive benefits for one at the expense of the other.  
 
In order to understand the negotiation process it is necessary with a conceptual 
discussion of the term “negotiation”. One of the more basic definitions was put 
forward in one of the earliest systematic works in the 1960s by Fred Charles Iklé, 
who defined negotiation as “a process in which explicit proposals are put forward 
ostensibly for the purpose of reaching an agreement on an exchange on the realization 
of a common interest where conflicting interests are present”(Iklé 1964:3-4). In a 
negotiation process there will always be some sort of common interest as the parties 
at least agree on initiating a negotiation. We can thus assume that prior to a 
negotiation a bargaining space exists (see definition below) in which both parties 
believe in a solution that is beneficial compared to the present situation. According to 
Pillar (1983:45) a government seeks to initiate peace negotiations if it has hopes to 
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 benefit from a possible agreement. Furthermore an agreement on both sides is 
required to begin a negotiation. According to this line of arguments, negotiations are 
most likely to start when both parties have common views of the preferable future 
course of the conflict, and both become aware that they hold such a common view.  
3.2.2 A basic game theoretic model 
A negotiation has to be developed from a situation where there are conflicting issues 
at stake (Hopmann 1996:25). If the parties have identical interests, then they do not 
need to negotiate to reach an acceptable solution. In game theoretic models of 
negotiations, relations between any two parties are conceived as falling along a 
continuum from completely identical interests to totally incompatible interests. The 
crucial problem is to locate the space where both parties find an agreement to be 
beneficial. Clearly neither party will accept an agreement that produces a negative 
outcome for them relative to the status quo. Therefore, the range of space within 
which agreements may occur is set off by the resistance points or points of 
indifference for the two parties. According to Hopmann (1996:56), these resistance 
points indicate the value a party can get without a negotiated agreement by acting 
unilaterally, where an agreement will no longer be advantageous. This principle by 
which negotiators determine their resistance points through comparing the value of an 
agreement at any stage with the value of a no-agreement has been referred to by 
Fisher et al. (1992:111) as Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). 
The BATNA can be illustrated in a basic model of negotiation (fig. 3.1.). There also 
exist more advanced models that consider the use of threats and promises, 
misinformation and commitments and hard versus soft bargaining style. However, the 
illustration of this simple model is useful in understanding the more basic 
assumptions upon which the game theoretic models are based. 
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Figure 3.1 A simple Model of Two-Party Negotiation 
 
1. Horizontal Axis = Issue Dimension 
2. Vertical Axis = Gains (+) and Losses (-) Relative to No agreement (0) 
3. A – A’ = A’s Preference Curve 
4. B – B’ = B’s Preference Curve 
5. a = A’s preferred outcome 
    a’= A’s BATNA 
    b = B’s preferred outcome 
    b’= B’s BATNA 
6. E = point of  ”equitable” solution, where gains of both parties relative to no agreement are equal. 
(Hopmann 1996:55). 
 
In this model we have a single issue depicted along the horizontal continuum, 
referred to as the issue dimension. It is important, however, to point out tat the issue 
dimension is not equal for both parties. In this figure, the horizontal line reflects actor 
A’s view on the issue. An agreement may be reached, in theory, at any position along 
this continuum. This framework focuses on the negotiation process in which the 
parties stake out positions and then change those positions along the issue dimension 
(Hopmann 1996:54). The value of an agreement at any position along this continuum 
varies for each of the parties, and these values are expressed on the vertical 
dimension as preference curves A – A’ and B – B’. Above the horizontal line marked 
“0” in the figure, the value of an agreement is increasingly positive, whereas below 
this midpoint the value of an agreement is negative and declining in value. The 
BATNA of each party is depicted in figure 3.1 as the point where its preference curve 
crosses the line of zero payoff, that is point a’ for actor A and b’ for actor B. Below 
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 these points the parties will be better off without negotiating. Point E indicates the 
“equitable” solution where gains of both parties relative to no agreement are equal. 
According to Hopmann (1996:50), simple game theoretic models are largely based 
upon a zero sum assumption: each side wants to decrease the others benefit while 
increase its own benefit. This implies that gains of one party, leads to a loss for the 
other party. The negotiation process is regarded as a process of concessions and 
reciprocation of concessions. Because of this, in theory, the parties are expected to 
make exaggerated demands in the beginning of the negotiations, as this may give 
them a better final result. Although simple game theoretic models provides a useful 
foundation for bargaining, it has a series of limitations that restricts its applicability 
on the bargaining process. The most important restriction, is that the model is static 
and focuses mostly on the relation between initial conditions and outcomes, with 
almost no attention to the bargaining process (ibid.) 
3.2.3 Critique of one-dimensional models 
Since about 1980 the focus in the field has moved beyond negotiation theory toward 
an approach that emphasizes the central role of integrative problem-solving in 
international negotiations (Hopmann 1996:76). This new perspective has grown out 
of a critique of some of the assumptions on which the game theoretic models have 
their fundament. The essence of this critique is first, that these models tend to depict 
issues as falling more or less along a single continuum, with opposed positions at 
each end. However, in contemporary international negotiations, issues are in most 
cases more complex and multidimensional than this.  
 
Second, the emphasis on a continuum also tends to exaggerate the element of conflict 
in the negotiations. Even though most negotiation theorists recognize the mixed 
motive nature of negotiations, the integrative element seldom went beyond the mutual 
desire to reach an agreement within the available bargaining space. The possibility of 
expanding or redefining the bargaining space to realize more fundamental or long-
term common interests is largely overlooked in this approach (Hopmann 1996:76). 
This can be illustrated by a classic example from 1978, where Egypt and Israel were 
negotiating over the Sinai Peninsula at Camp David. The Sinai territory was divided 
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 down the middle by a line of disengagement in 1975. The US president, Jimmy 
Carter, who played the role as mediator between the two countries representatives, 
Sadat and Begin, realized that moving the disengagement line towards either side, 
implied victory for one of the parties and a loss for the other. President Carter 
encouraged the two parties to seek a mutually beneficial, positive sum solution, rather 
than continue to divide the Sinai (Hopmann 1996:90, Fisher et al. 1992:54, Rubin et 
al. 1994:4). There were no way this issue could be disaggregated and there were no 
equally important issues that could be used as tradeoffs. After discussing the issue, 
they found out that Egypt’s interest in regaining control of the Sinai was to restore its 
national integrity, to regain the territory that it perceived to have been unjustly stolen 
from them by force in 1967. On the other hand, Israel’s interest in the Sinai was 
basically a question of security. Israel felt threatened by a powerful neighbour with 
large quantities of hostile troops on its border and within a few hours of its capital. So 
the Israeli interest was based on the need for self defence in the face of a hostile 
neighbour. The solution to the problem became that the entire territory was returned 
to Egypt, but at the same time demilitarized. With this solution, both countries 
achieved their essential objectives; Egypt regained complete sovereignty over the 
territory, and Israel assured itself that Egyptian military forces was removed far back 
from the border. In this way, neither of the parties had to concede the other as both 
countries gained from the agreement. This example illustrates how the move from a 
one-dimensional negotiation to a problem-solving approach may be advantageous in 
some cases. By negotiating over the disengagement line, neither of the parties could 
be satisfied, without creating dissatisfaction on the other side. By using a problem-
solving approach, with emphasis on finding the parties’ real interests, it became 
possible to find a solution satisfactory to both parties. 
 
Third, the game theoretic models emphasize the negotiation as one where the parties 
take positions along the continuum, and the dynamics are largely restricted to making 
initial offers, making concessions and retractions and eventually reach an agreement 
or end up in stalemates. The idea that the parties take and hold firmly on to fixed 
positions seems stylized and simplistic, and introduces a great deal of rigidity into 
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 most negotiations (Hopmann 1996:76). Fourth, the emphasis of negotiation tactics, 
such as hard versus soft bargaining, and the use of threats and promises, has 
frequently proved to be dysfunctional (ibid.). 
3.3 The negotiation process and the third party role 
3.3.1 Problem-solving theory of negotiations 
As discussed above, more recent theories of international negotiations emphasize the 
importance of approaching the negotiations from a problem-solving rather than a 
confrontational perspective (Hopmann 1996:87). That is, to convert the negotiation 
from a zero-sum to a non-zero-sum game. Fisher et al. (1992:37) argue that parties in 
a conflict should not view each other as adversaries negotiating against one another, 
but rather that they should view the situation as one in which they have a common 
problem that needs to be overcome by taking joint decisions. Based on this 
perspective, the problem to be solved is the adversary and not the other part as game 
theoretic approaches assumes.  Problem-solving can be defined as any effort to 
develop a mutually acceptable solution to a conflict: 
 
“[…] problem-solving involves a joint effort to find a mutually acceptable 
solution. The parties or their representatives talk freely to one another. They 
exchange information about their interests and priorities, work together to 
identify the true issues dividing them, brainstorm in search for alternatives 
that bridge their opposing interests, and collectively evaluate these 
alternatives from the viewpoint of their mutual welfare.” (Rubin et al. 
1994:169). 
 
Rubin et al. (1994:182-184) have, based on this line of arguments suggested four 
steps for employing problem-solving in the negotiation process: 
 
First, the parties should try to determine if there really is a conflict of interest or if the 
conflict is primarily illusory and the result of misunderstandings and misperceptions. 
If it turns out to be the latter, then the conflict may simply disappear. The example 
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 mentioned above about the negotiation between Israel and Egypt is a good example 
in this regard. As it turned out, there was not really a conflict of interest between the 
two parties.  
 
Second, each party should analyze its own self-interest and should set high, but 
reasonable aspirations for what it wishes to achieve from the negotiation. If parties 
are not clear about their interests, they may signal weakness to the other, thereby 
setting off a cycle of exploitation and returning the process to more conflictual 
negotiation. If they do not have reasonably high aspirations, they may be willing to 
settle for lowest common denominator compromises rather than seeking more 
optimal and mutually beneficial results. At the same time, the aspirations must remain 
realistic so that they do not cut off the potential to reach integrative agreements.  
 
Third, when each party is clear about its own interests and aspirations, then it should 
attempt to persuade the other to accept at least its most important goal as valid. This 
means that each party will have to be prepared to reveal its underlying interests and 
needs to the other, at the possible risk that the other might use these to its own 
advantage. Yet unless both parties are willing to run the necessary risks of revealing 
information reciprocally, they will never be able to identify potential integrative 
solutions to their problem. The two parties should then jointly seek ways of 
reconciling their different aspirations with one another. 
 
Final, if at first they fail to identify appropriate integrative solutions, they should 
simultaneously and reciprocally lower both sets of aspirations and continue to search 
for integrative solutions that may bridge or embrace jointly these lowered aspiration 
levels. They should continue this process of search and adjustment until either 
agreement is eventually found or until they agree between themselves that no 
agreement is possible and they decide to withdraw from negotiations.  
 
The problem-solving approach differs from the traditional negotiation model in the 
sense that it breaks with some of its fundamental assumptions. The traditional model 
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 tends to depict the issue to be negotiated as falling more or less along a single 
continuum (Hopmann 1996:76). On the other side, the problem solving approach 
assumes that most issues in international negotiations are more complex and 
multidimensional than this. Therefore it is necessary to use other methods and 
techniques in order to reach solutions that are satisfactory to both parties. Although 
the problem-solving approach breaks with some of the fundamental assumptions to 
the traditional negotiation model, this break is not complete, as most of these theories 
use the same theoretical formulations and central concepts. Also, what I earlier have 
described as the BATNA, is more or less similar in both approaches.  
 
My argument is not that all conflicts should be resolved within the framework of 
problem-solving. In many situations conflicts between two parties consist of several 
issues to be negotiated. Some of the issues are simple and easy to negotiate, while 
others are more complex and multidimensional. It might be fruitful to resolve some of 
the issues within the game theoretic approach, especially in cases where the issue to 
be resolved is clearly defined, and more or less falling along a continuum. In these 
cases, the parties may use the method of concessions and reciprocation of these in 
order to reach a compromise. In other cases where the conflict is over an issue that is 
multidimensional, either in terms of parties or issues, it might be advantageous to use 
a problem-solving rather than a game theoretic approach. 
 
Until now the discussion has focused on the theoretical aspects of the nature of 
negotiations. In the rest of the chapter, I will discuss other important factors related to 
the negotiation process; barriers to starting negotiations; the three phases of a 
negotiation process; and the potential role for a third party in the negotiation process. 
Regarding the last point, which will constitute the framework for analyzing the 
Norwegian approach to peace, I will focus on both their role in overcoming barriers, 
the nature of the third party and the strategies they may employ. 
3.3.2 Barriers to initiating negotiations 
To start a negotiation between conflicting parties may be a difficult matter, and Pillar 
(1983:64-77) has identified three main barriers to the initiation of negotiations 
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 between conflicting parties. These barriers must be overcome for a negotiation 
process to begin.  
 
The first barrier is that parties in conflict often tend to exaggerate the extent to which 
interests conflict. This implies that governments by creating images of themselves 
and their politics, and the opponent and their politics, make a false image of both. The 
reason for this image building may first be to convince the opponent of their 
determination and confidence. The government does this based on the assumption 
that such an image might give them a stronger position before an eventual negotiation 
and subsequently a better outcome of negotiations. Second, the government’s object 
of such image-creation may be to bolster internal morale by showing the leadership’s 
determination. Because of this, there exists a risk of diminishing the other side’s 
estimate of the possibilities for an early negotiated settlement.  
 
The second barrier identified by Pillar is the reluctance to move first. An offer to 
negotiate may be used as general evidence of intentions, plans and aspirations. The 
act itself of proposing talks has implications and effects besides making negotiations 
possible. The pervasive notion that an initial offer to negotiate is a “suing for peace” 
leads governments to resist making such offers for fear of being considered the 
defeated party or for fear of achieving a poor result of eventual negotiations. 
 
The last main barrier to overcome according to Pillar (1983:69) is the imposition of 
conditions to begin negotiations. This barrier includes the negotiation itself. Central 
issues are details about e.g. site and level of representation in the negotiations as well 
as the substance of the peace agreement. The initiation a peace conference always 
entails some conditions of the first type, since the parties must at least agree on a 
meeting place and a time for the conference to occur. It is rare for talks to break down 
due to disagreements over conditions and overcoming this barrier is easier than the 
other barriers. 
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 3.3.3 Overcoming barriers to negotiations 
Regarding the first barrier (i.e. the tendency to exaggerate the conflict), the most 
effective method of overcoming mistrust between the conflicting parties, is probably 
a face to face meeting between the top leaders of each side (Pillar 1983:80). Such 
official high level contacts can most quickly dispel mistrust, but also low level or 
unofficial contacts are less likely to be seen as a sign of weakness. Pillar (ibid.), 
claims that even an initiative by a third party does not lower this barrier. However I 
will argue that an entrusted third party may work as a go-between between the two 
parties in order to reduce their mistrust. This may be on official level, but also by 
creating contacts at a lower level.  
 
Overcoming the second barrier (i.e. the reluctance to move first), a suitable proposal 
by a third party may eliminate the need for either party in the conflict to move first in 
the negotiations (Pillar 1983:79). Both sides’ indications of readiness to make peace 
become responses to someone else’s proposal and thus are less readily interpreted as 
signs of weakness. An effort by a third party to arrange peace negotiations forces the 
conflicting parties to indicate whether or not they are ready to talk. Demonstrating 
peaceful intentions and avoiding the blame for continued hostilities may be reason 
enough for a government to respond positively to such an effort, even if it prefers to 
delay negotiation or does not believe that the effort will produce any results. 
According to Pillar (1983:45), a government seeks peace negotiations if it hopes to 
benefit from an agreement. Furthermore an agreement on both sides is required to 
initiate negotiations.  Negotiations are thus most likely to open when both parties 
have common views of the future course of the conflict, and both become aware that 
they hold such a common view.  
 
As a contextual condition, Bercovitch and Houston (1995) emphasizes that the 
duration and timing of the intervention is important regarding the nature of the 
disputes. Mediation must take place at a propitious moment. In the literature there 
exists disagreement about when mediation must take place in order to increase the 
probability of successful intervention. A central concept in the work of William 
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 Zartman is “the ripe moment” (Zartman 1991:16). This moment refers to a situation 
where both parties at the same time have an interest in finding an agreement. These 
situations seldom occur, and when they do it is important to take action. As discussed 
above, Pillar (1983:79) stated that an effort by a third party, forces the conflicting 
parties to indicate whether or not they are ready to talk.  
 
Regarding the third barrier (i.e. the conditions for negotiations), Bercovitch and 
Houston (1995) argue that the negotiations are most likely to succeed when the 
parties’ conflict management takes place in a neutral environment, free from external 
pressures and influences of constituents and media. Such an environment allows the 
mediator to have procedural control over the process while the parties may 
concentrate on the more substantive issues. Such an environment makes the mediator 
able to create a level playing field by guaranteeing each party free and equal access to 
information and resources and by maintaining the flow of communication between 
the parties (Bercovitch and Houston 1995:29).  
3.3.4 Phases in the negotiation process 
In order to facilitate the analysis of negotiations it may be useful to divide the process 
into different phases. According to Zartman and Berman (1982) the negotiation 
process may be divided into three different phases; 1) Diagnosis, 2) Formula 
construction, 3) Agreement on details. Although these phases do not always occur in 
a strict temporal order, they do tend to organize themselves in a more or less logical 
sequence.  
Diagnosis 
The diagnosis is basically the process in which the parties try to evaluate and 
understand the problem that they are negotiating to decide if it is negotiable, and to 
find an agenda for conducting the negotiation (Hopmann 1996:78). A central feature 
during the first phase is uncertainty. During this period the parties use their time in 
increasing their knowledge about each other, while avoiding errors caused by 
ignorance (Pillar 1983:80). This phase serves to eliminate unrealistic demands, often 
advanced for an external audience, as well as to enlighten the parties about each 
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 other’s intentions and objectives. An important issue is the one of timing. It might be 
that not all of the subjects to be negotiated are ripe for negotiation at the same time. 
Therefore, it is important to set an agenda for when to negotiate the respective topics. 
In some cases it might be advantageous to first negotiate the easiest, and maybe least 
important subjects, and wait with the more complex and difficult ones. In short, the 
diagnostic phase is the one in which the parties make an initial commitment to 
negotiate with one another in an effort to resolve a jointly recognized conflict of 
interest. 
Formula construction 
The second phase is referred to as that of formula construction (Zartman and Berman 
1982:87). Here, the idea is that the parties create a formula or common definition of 
the conflict in terms amenable to solution. We now have a situation where the parties 
clearly perceive the issues which divide them, having a fairly good idea of the other 
party’s genuine objectives and being confident that the other party is serious about 
negotiating. Both parties believe that a bargaining space exists and that a negotiated 
settlement is possible (Pillar 1983:59). According to Zartman and Berman (1982:87) 
this phase begins when the parties acknowledge each others’ seriousness to the 
negotiation, and both parties are serious about finding a solution. This implies that 
they are willing to lose a little to win a little, rather than win or lose all in a non-
negotiated approach. In this phase the parties should create a framework content of a 
shared definition of the conflict, and how to resolve the conflicting issues. Some 
formulas may be constructed inductively through mutual concessions and 
reciprocation of concessions, as described within the game theoretic models. This 
way of approaching the formula is expected to be most efficient on issues where the 
fundamental assumptions to the negotiation model are met, that is when the issue in 
regarded as fairly simple, and may be considered as more or less falling along a 
continuum. A necessary condition is that the bargaining space is located by both 
parties, and both parties are willing to make concessions in order to reach a 
compromised agreement (Hopmann 1996:80). 
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 In cases where the problem to be solved is regarded as more complex and 
multidimensional with regard to issues or parties in the conflict, formulas are more 
likely to be constructed deductively. This may also occur when the issue involves 
very fundamental interests or beliefs that are not readily amenable to solution by 
compromise. The formula may try to upgrade common interests that the parties share 
or suggest new ways of conceptualizing the issue so that a problem can be solved 
integratively. An integrative solution integrates the interests of both parties (Rubin et 
al. 1994:171). Integrative solutions sometimes entail known alternatives, but often 
they involve the development of new alternatives and require some creativity and 
imagination. Rubin et al. (1994:172) identify some advantages by reaching 
integrative solutions. First of all, in some cases, it may not be possible to reach 
solutions, unless a way can be found to join the two parties’ interests. Second, 
agreements involving higher joint benefit are likely to be more stable. More 
mechanical agreements, as for example compromises, are often unsatisfying to one or 
both parties, and the issue is likely to come up again at a later stage. Such an 
agreement has been reached through concessions and reciprocations of concessions 
and therefore both parties have had to give up their preferable outcome to reach a 
compromise with the other party. Third, because the integrative solutions are 
mutually rewarding, they tend to strengthen the relationship between the parties, and 
this may have an inherent value, and also may facilitate the development of 
integrative solutions in subsequent situations.  
Implementation of details 
The third phase refers to the negotiation of details to implement the formula on 
precise points of dispute. As the second phase serves to create a framework for an 
agreement, the third phase serves to work out all the necessary details for the 
implementation of the agreements (Hopmann 1996:85). In many cases, negotiation 
over details may reveal problems that cannot be solved within the framework of the 
agreed formula, and the parties may have to return to the second phase in order to 
improve the formula, so that it can cover all necessary details.  
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 3.3.5 Third parties in negotiations 
Third parties may contribute in different ways in negotiations, but have some basic 
characteristics. According to Hopmann (1996:221), they do not act as direct 
participants in the negotiations and their role is rather to assist the conflicting parties 
to reach agreement in what otherwise basically remains a bilateral negotiation. In 
some respects third party roles are completely consistent with the basic structure of 
bilateral negotiations in the sense that they seek to help the parties to a dispute to find 
cooperative interests that take priority over the conflicting interest. The mediators are 
usually individuals representing a state, an international organization, or an NGO that 
have some relevant power, authority or legitimacy in the eyes of the conflicting 
parties and are selected because of their skills as go-betweens. According to Touval 
and Zartman (1985:7) the intervention of a third party “[…] must be acceptable to the 
adversaries in the conflict, who cooperate diplomatically with the intervenor”. 
Furthermore, it does not involve the use of force and is not intended to help one of the 
parties to win or prevail. 
 
Further on, I will discuss the qualities a third party should possess in order to be 
effective. My emphasis will be on qualities such as neutrality, legitimacy and 
previous relations with the conflicting parties. This discussion leads me to what 
strategic choices a third party has for effective mediation. All these factors will later 
be discussed and compared with the Norwegian approach to peace. 
3.3.6 Nature of the third party 
An important aspect is the nature of the third party. A third party cannot mediate 
unless they are perceived as reasonable, acceptable, knowledgeable and able to secure 
the trust and cooperation of both disputants. Variables are personal qualities, rank and 
previous relationship with the parties. As personal qualities Bercovitch and Houston 
(1995:26) emphasizes neutrality and legitimacy.  
Neutrality 
The concept “neutrality” is not well defined in literature, and calls for a more precise 
definition before it can be used as an analytic tool. It hardly occurs that third parties 
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 are totally neutral to a conflict. There will always be some sort of self interest and 
reasons for acting as a third party. Therefore I define a neutral third party as an agent 
that is regarded by both parties as impartial and as not having any vested interest in 
the outcome of the negotiations. With this definition the third party do neither have to 
be absolutely neutral to the conflict, nor will suspicions that it favours one of the 
parties in the negotiations exist. There exist different opinions on whether a neutral 
third party is advantageous compared to a partisan third party in negotiations. 
Bercovitch and Houston (1995:26) are doubtful of the importance of this attribute. 
They mean that the traditional emphasis on impartiality stems from the failure to 
recognize mediation as a reciprocal process of social interaction in which the 
mediator is a major participant. Hopmann (1996:225) means that the mediator should 
be neutral, but if it is not absolutely neutral it can serve as mediator as long as the 
mediator is trusted by both parties.  However, in many situations a neutral third party 
may contribute to create confidence between the conflicting parties. As the third 
party, when neutral, do not have any vested interest in the outcome of the 
negotiations the conflicting parties will be more likely to trust the third party as 
mediator or facilitator. The word “trust” is important in this respect. Many analysts 
consider trust between the conflicting parties and the third party as more important 
than absolute neutrality (ibid.). Trust implies that the conflicting parties have 
confidence in the third party in considering the fundamental interests of both when 
mediating. Therefore, in many cases neutrality is not an absolute necessity, as long as 
the conflicting parties trust the third party in considering the fundamental interests of 
both.  
 
There are also situations where a partisan third party may be advantageous compared 
to a neutral party. This may be in situations where one of the parties has to make 
large and significant concessions for an agreement to be reached (Hopmann 
1996:225). In such a case, a partisan third party may be more able to obtain such 
meaningful concessions. If we go back to our example from chapter 3.2.3., it was the 
former US president Jimmy Carter that mediated between Israel and Egypt in their 
negotiation over the Sinai Peninsula. As a US representative, and therefore regarded 
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 as pro Israeli, he was likely to be looked upon as a partisan third party. At the same 
time, Israel had to make considerable concessions for the reaching of an agreement. 
Because of the close relation between Israel and the US, it made it possible for Carter 
to get Israel to make these (Hopmann 1996:225).  
 
Related to the discussion on neutrality, a new debate arises on whether small states 
may have advantages as a third party compared to more powerful states or vice versa. 
In many situations it is more likely that a small state, like for example Norway or 
Sweden, easier may gain trust from conflicting parties than a super power like the 
US. At the same time a small country may not have the same means to pull through 
agreements (Slim 1992:207). A small state does usually not have any other means 
than facilitation or persuasion, while a super power may lean on means such as 
threats and punishment to force through agreements. However, small states can 
succeed in mediating conflicts without leaving the residual feelings of resentment and 
unfair treatment that usually follow similar interventions by more powerful states 
(ibid). 
Legitimacy 
To exercise any degree of influence, mediators need leverage or resources to search 
for information and move the parties away from rigid positions. According to 
Bercovitch and Houston (1995:26) effective mediation in international relations is 
more a matter of mediator’s utilization of resources, leverage and influence 
commensurate with their position to enhance fairness than it is of impartiality. An 
important attribute for any international mediator is legitimacy. Legitimacy I define 
as what resources the mediator posses, his/her individual personality or intellectual 
skills that make him or her especially appropriate for this role, a widespread 
perception of fairness in approaching the issues and the occupation of a formal 
position of special significance. Leaders of states and high-level officials such as 
foreign or prime ministers have legitimacy and can bring it to bear together with their 
status and respect. Under the proper auspices and sponsorship of high-ranking 
mediators, an environment of credibility, trust and joint interests may be established.  
 51
 Previous relations with the parties 
A final variable regarding the nature of the mediator is his/her previous relationship 
with the parties. When a mediator is aligned with one of the parties or has a common 
experience or goals with one party and future interactions are important to both, each 
disputant may show greater flexibility and confidence in the outcome. Mediator 
alignment, past relationship with the adversaries, and the mediator’s own interest 
affect both mediator behaviour and mediation outcomes (Bercovitch and Houston 
1995:27).  
3.3.7 Third party strategies 
In theory, a third party or a mediator may lean on different strategies in order to assist 
conflicting parties in reaching agreements. The methods used are often divided in two 
categories; mediation and arbitration (Touval and Zartman 1985). In this thesis I will 
focus on strategies within the category of mediation, as this is the method relevant for 
the Norwegian involvement on Hispaniola. 
 
There are different categorizations and typologies of which strategies mediators may 
follow in a peace making efforts. By using various combinations of power – reward 
power, coercive power and informational power – mediators attempt to increase the 
possibility of agreement alternatives. Touval and Zartman (1985) points out 3 main 
strategies for the third party. The first strategy is the role of communication 
facilitator. Here, the third party function as a channel of communication where the 
third party works as a go-between. The third party also creates conditions that are 
conducive to reaching agreement. This implies provision of offices, establishing a 
good atmosphere for negotiation, including working schedule and pleasant 
environment (Hopmann 1996:231). The third party will also play a modest role in 
improving communication and participate in determining whether or not there exists 
a bargaining space. The main advantage of this strategy is that the conflicting parties 
reach an agreement they are committed to, mainly because the negotiations have been 
reached free from external pressure. If the parties are able to reach agreements in 
such a way, they may easier arrange for new negotiations and reach agreements if 
new conflicts should arise in the future. They will then already have created methods 
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 for how to negotiate and they will be familiar with each others goals and objectives. 
This strategy, however, implies that the parties have the necessary motivation for 
reaching agreements and is disadvantageous in the sense that the conflict may not be 
resolvable without the third party’s involvement in the negotiation itself. 
 
The second strategy identified by Touval and Zartman (1985) is the procedural 
strategy. It differs from the first strategy in the sense that the third party exercises a 
more formal control over the negotiations. This implies that the third party does not 
only act as a facilitator for communication, but also as a facilitator for compromise 
and convergence. A common problem in the first phase of a negotiation is the 
reluctance by the negotiating parties to make the first move. A third party may in 
these kinds of situations contribute to clarify the negotiating parties’ fundamental 
interests or BATNAs. It may act as a facilitator for at least a basic flow of 
communication for the parties, in order to make negotiations successful. This is 
especially important in situations where openness and full information may be 
exploited by one or both of the parties for its own benefit. In other words, the third 
party will assist the negotiating parties in solving problems related to concessions, but 
also facilitate the process of reciprocation. The third party may as well assist the 
parties in seeing the problems in a new light and help to achieve integrative benefits, 
rather than individual gain. A common method is letting the parties reverse roles, in 
order to better understand the other party’s preferences and to reduce 
misunderstandings (Hopmann 1996:233). The main advantage using this strategy is 
that it is most likely to produce stable agreements, but it is disadvantageous in the 
sense that it might be expensive in time and effort (Carnevale 1986:10). Furthermore, 
it may be advantageous compared to the first strategy in situations where the 
negotiating parties are not able to reach agreements without the third party assisting 
them in the process of concessions and reciprocations.  
 
As a final option the third party may choose to use directive strategies (Touval and 
Zartman 1985). Here the mediator sets out to affect the content and substance as well 
as the process of mediation. The mediator use leverage and introduce resources of 
 53
 power, influence and persuasion that can be brought to bear on the parties to move 
them to agreement (Hopmann 1996:240). Methods that may be used are control 
timing and sequencing of concessions or other negotiating moves as well as control 
the information available to the parties. They also may exert a direct influence to 
move the negotiations forward in directions favoured by the mediator and manipulate 
the international environment in ways that may affect the outcome of the 
negotiations. Carnevale (1986:4-5) discusses two more methods that fall in under the 
category of directive strategies; pressing and compensation. With pressing implies 
that the mediator may place restrictions on the range of outcome alternatives, by e.g. 
reducing the set of non-agreement alternatives. The mediator may create the 
impression that consequences of not agreeing to an alternative are not good. The 
advantage of using pressure as a method is that it is normally quick, easy and does no 
require much effort, but there are several disadvantages connected to this method. 
First of all it may create a distance between the parties and the mediator, and also 
between each other. Second, and maybe most important, using pressing may produce 
poor outcomes of the conflicts at stake in the negotiation. By using compensation as 
method, the mediator gives something desirable to one or both parties and by doing 
so there will be increasing agreement possibilities in the region of common ground. 
The main advantage using this method is that in some cases it may be the only way to 
get an agreement and at the same time keep the parties happy. The most obvious 
disadvantage is that it may be expensive to the mediator, but also that there may 
become an undesirable dependence of the disputants on the mediator. However, in 
some situations it may be the only way to get an agreement and at the same time keep 
the parties satisfied.   
3.3.8 When the moment is ripe 
I have now discussed some attributes a third party should possess, and different 
strategies a third party may use in order to be an efficient third party. Also important 
to discuss is when a third party should initiate its involvement. W. Zartman (1991:16) 
has introduced a concept he calls “the ripe moment”. Zartman (1991) argues that 
some moments are better than others for managing and resolving conflict. This 
moment may be identified in light of the conflict’s intensification, escalation, turning 
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 points and crisis. Zartman identifies five necessary components for the ripe moment. 
The basic component he defines as a deadlock that keeps both parties from achieving 
their goals. However, the deadlock alone is not enough as it must be a particular kind 
of stalemate that hurts both parties enough to make them feel uncomfortable and 
unable to break out by an escalation with acceptable costs. In addition it needs to be 
riveted to the parties’ perception through a recent catastrophe. The last two 
components he defines as: there must be a formula for a way out, and an indication 
that the parties are willing in principle to choose it.  
 
In short, one could say that the ripe moment takes place when both parties realize that 
they both want to get out of the conflict using peaceful methods. This moment is 
followed by a time when the parties discuss, work out and agree on mutual acceptable 
principles or models for a common future without violence (Wallensten 1994:274). 
 
Hopmann (1996:78) argues that not all conflicting issues necessarily are ripe for 
resolution at the same time. Also the same issue may or may not be ripe for resolution 
depending on factors such as the international context, the domestic situation or the 
state of the problem. What I earlier have described as the diagnosis phase, is an 
important phase in determining whether a conflicting issue is ripe for resolution 
(ibid.). 
3.3.9 Who should negotiate? The role of NGOs and the civil society 
The negotiation theory discussed above, focus mostly on negotiations between top-
level state leaders and diplomats. However, it is important to also include other actors 
at different levels in the theoretical framework as these may play a vital role in peace-
making efforts. Lederach (1993:44-55) has in this regard identified three approaches 
to peace building. The following figure illustrates the three approaches: 
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Figure 3.2. Approaches to peace-building 
 
Within the first, the focus is on the already mentioned top-level approach. This is 
based on a “top-down” perspective to peace-building. Within this approach, the 
people who emerge as mediators are people with a known public profile, and the goal 
is to achieve a negotiated settlement between the principal high-level leaders in the 
conflict. This method is a kind of state to state negotiation that is normally based on a 
principal-agent system. This implies that an agent, often a diplomat of some sort, 
represents the home government (principal) in a negotiation. Most of the rationalist 
theories assume that states are autonomous actors in international relations that have 
clearly defined national interests and an ordered set of preferences of goals and 
values (Hopmann 1996:153). However, critics to this approach claims that there is no 
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 such thing as a generally shared set of objectives or preferences. Rather, they assert 
that a state’s preferences are a varied set of goals and values from a wide range of 
interest groups within the society. Each of these groups has their own set of interests. 
This leads to a situation where the state operates on the basis of “the principle of 
bounded rationality”, which implies that the state’s preferences is a result of internal 
negotiations between these different groups and reflects a common lowest 
determinator rather than an explicit agreement on goals. This thesis is not the place 
for entering this debate. However, the debate may be used to discuss the role of civil 
society as an agent in negotiations. 
 
The second approach is the middle-range approach, which is based on the assumption 
that the middle range, or civil society as I have called it, contains a set of leaders that 
might provide the key to create an infrastructure for achieving and sustaining peace. 
The basic idea behind this approach is this: by initiating a dialogue between leaders 
of the civil society, or “middle range persons”, will attract the press and also create a 
political interest. Their position in the society is defined as independent of the 
authority and the structures of the government or major opposition movements 
(Lederach 1997:41). These persons may be highly respected individuals or persons 
that have formal positions of leadership in sectors such as education, business, 
agriculture or health. Yet another approach is to use linking groups that already exist 
in the setting. This may be religious groups, academic institutions or humanitarian 
NGOs. Anyway, the most important attribute is that these persons have connection to 
the top level, but at the same time they are not bounded by political calculations 
(ibid). Further on, they should be familiar with experiences from people at the 
grassroot level. These attributed enables them to regard the conflict and the 
conflicting issues from different perspectives at the same time as they are more 
flexible compared to top politicians.  
 
The third approach identified by Lederach (1993:51) is the grassroot approach. This 
kind of approach faces different challenges from those confronting the top and 
middle-range levels. This is due to the massive number of people involved, and these 
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 strategies represent points of contact with the masses rather than a comprehensive 
program for reaching them. 
 
The Norwegian model to peace is mainly linked to Lederach’s second approach, 
because it emphasizes the use of NGOs in peace making efforts. According to Natsios 
(1997) the NGO is a unique and underused instrument in conflict resolution, but it 
has significant limitations as well. In the case of societies whose government has 
entirely collapsed, NGOs and religious institutions may be the only sources of 
authority that have any influence. Diplomats are used to deal with diplomats, and if 
they loose their authority in a society, a NGO may be a viable institution in the 
absence of any other levers of influence during these complex emergencies. In those 
situations a NGO is often the only organization with the operational capability to 
perform some of the tasks essential to the implementation of the peace process. 
Natsios discuss several strengths and weaknesses of NGOs as mediators. As NGOs 
often works on the lowest level of social order they have the capability of creating 
trust and loyalty between NGOs and the local community. Their connection to local 
communities may also be seen as a weakness in the sense that it may distort NGOs 
understanding of what is happening in the country as a whole. Local conditions may 
not be representative to the situation in general. Another weakness is that there are 
often too many NGOs. This may result in contradicting approaches to the peace 
making effort. The result of lack of coordination is at the best that scarce resources 
are not used to optimum effect (Egeland 1999). At worst the variety of activities can 
lead to situations where a number of different, well meaning agencies and 
organizations nullify each other’s work. But still there are advantages in using NGOs 
as mediators. NGOs with development programs prior to conflict implicates that the 
NGOs have certain familiarity with the culture, the ethnic groups and the 
development problems in the country as well as an indigenous staff base.  
 
According to Anderson (1996), NGO activities have had many positive effects when 
it comes to peace-making. Still there have been many instances where NGO aid 
produced unintended and even counter-productive consequences. Many NGOs fail to 
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 consider the political implications of their work and by doing so NGOs have in many 
cases exacerbated the very conflicts and violence they were seeking to relieve. The 
author notes that NGOs must choose to employ some people (and not others), 
purchase goods from some (and not others), and target their aid toward some people 
and that these decisions may contribute to separation of group identities, inequalities 
and jealousies (ibid.). Publicizing human rights abuses can provoke both increased 
outrage and a defensive response in the perpetrators, and so further harden their 
opposition. Sometimes the NGOs that may be most qualified to involve themselves in 
mediation, are those who receive high proportion of total funding from government 
grants. The reason is that these NGOs normally are more comfortable and familiar 
with protocols and sensitivities of official diplomacy. However there might be 
situations where distance from a government is a useful attribute for a NGO as a 
mediator. In these situations, NGOs that accept little public-sector funding and have 
few official ties to governments may be a better choice to undertake conflict-
resolution activities. 
3.4 Hypotheses to be investigated 
Based on the theoretical discussion above I have operationalized the following 
hypotheses to investigate in order to answer my research question: 
 
H1 a) The Oslo Dialogue is based on a problem solving approach to 
negotiations. 
 b) This has proved to be efficient in terms of progress in the dialogue. 
 
H2 The personal relations between the Norwegian actors and people at top, 
middle and grass root level on both sides of the conflict have made the 
parties overcoming barriers to negotiation. 
 
H3 a) The Norwegian actors were regarded as not having any vested interest 
in the particular outcome of the negotiations. 
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  b) This precondition was important for the negotiations. 
 
H4 a) The Norwegian actors functioned only as facilitators and did not 
involve themselves in the negotiations. 
 b) This was important for the negotiations. 
 
H5 The MFA’s use of NCA’s network has been important for the process. 
 
H6 The involvement of the civil society in the negotiations has been important 
in order to reach substantive and lasting solutions. 
 
H7 a) The Norwegian actors have involved themselves with a long term 
perspective. 
 b) This has been important for the negotiations. 
 
H8  a) The Norwegian actors have involved themselves at the ripe moment. 
b) This has been important for the opening of negotiations. 
 
In the following I will use the theories described above to explain the progress in the 
Oslo Dialogue between representatives of Haiti and the Dominican Republic and to 
analyse the role of the Norwegian authorities in this process. I will emphasize the 
problem-solving approach to explain the progress of the dialogue. When analyzing 
the role of Norway as the third party I will emphasize both their nature and the 
strategies used. Although these theories focus on negotiations between state leaders 
or entrusted agents in already erupted conflicts or declared wars, I will show that they 
are applicable to this conflict preventive process between representatives of civil 
society organizations. 
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 4. Analysis 
The Norwegian involvement on Hispaniola started after a request from the former US 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Madeleine Albright in 1998. Initially, the Norwegian 
involvement was intended to contribute to strengthen the democracy on Haiti and 
easing the tense relationship between the opposition and the government. The MFA 
contacted the NCA for assistance to create a political dialogue on Haiti. The NCA 
had been working in the Dominican Republic since 1979 and in Haiti since 1987, and 
had developed a large network and a broad knowledge about the two countries 
(Sandved 2004 [personal correspondence]).  
 
The Norwegian involvement focused first on creating an internal dialogue on Haiti.  
The experiences from this process revealed a need of a dialogue also between the two 
countries of Hispaniola, and the MFA together with NCA therefore initiated a 
dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, a process that runs parallel to 
the internal dialogue on Haiti. The idea was that improving the relationship between 
the two countries, would contribute to stabilize the political situation within Haiti.  
 
Since 1998, three meetings between leaders of civil society organizations from both 
countries have been held in Oslo (the Oslo Dialogue). The result of these meetings 
and the following up of the agreements will constitute the core of this analysis. 
 
This analysis starts with a more precise definition of the conflict, and I analyze the 
Oslo Dialogue in light of the theoretical framework presented in chapter 3. I argue 
that the actors in the conflict is on one side the group of Haitian migrants living in the 
Dominican Republic and on the other side the Dominican government, and that the 
conflict first and foremost is connected to human rights. The simple game theoretic 
model depicted in chapter 3.2.2 will be used to illustrate how there was no bargaining 
space between the actors prior to the Oslo Dialogue. In chapter 4.2.1., I will illustrate 
how the problem solving approach in the Oslo Dialogue has contributed to create a 
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 bargaining space between the actors, by a change in the Dominican government’s 
preference curve. This shows how a simple game theoretic model and theories of 
problem solving approaches to negotiations are compatible to explain this conflict 
and the negotiation process. The hypotheses presented in chapter 3.4 will then be 
analyzed in light of the theoretical framework, emphasizing the nature of Norway as a 
third party and the strategies used by the Norwegian actors. 
 
The core of my analysis will be based on the working documents produced in the 
three dialogue-meetings in Oslo and on interviews with participants in the Oslo 
Dialogue. 
4.1 The conflict and the Norwegian involvement 
4.1.1 The conflict – a human rights issue 
In Oslo, the participants debated four main topics; migration, the border situation, 
economic relations, and human rights issues. These four topics are highly interrelated, 
and I will treat the migration issue and the human rights issue under the same 
category and the border situation and economic relations under another category. 
 
Illegal migration and violent deportation of migrants 
The main conflicting issue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic stems from the 
large scale migration of Haitians towards the Dominican Republic. As described in 
the introduction chapter, about one million Haitians live in the Dominican Republic 
today and a large number of these are living there on an illegal basis. The majority of 
the migrants live under conditions that are below the minimum standards according to 
international human rights conventions (Fletcher et al 2002:13). They are illiterate, 
they do not receive any form of social benefits and they constantly face the danger of 
being sent back to their country of origin. This deportation of migrants by the 
Dominican government often occurs in ways that are clearly violation of international 
as well as Dominican laws. The American Convention3 on Human Rights has 
                                                 
3 The American Convention on Human Rights was signed in 1978 by the member states of OAS.  
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 established minimal due process protections that apply to deportation procedures 
(Fletcher et al 2002:14). For example, there is a prohibition against collective 
expulsions in the American Convention4, and according to Dominican law an 
individual subject to deportation is to be afforded the “opportunity to be heard and to 
present arguments on his or her behalf”5 (ibid.).  Even though some of the Haitians do 
have a working permit or legal papers, they do not get a chance to bring forth such 
papers, as the Dominican police or military use force to deport them, without any 
warning in advance. In many situations like these, Haitians are deported even when 
they have a legal residence permit in the Dominican Republic, have to leave behind 
all their belongings, and in many situations, their families as well. The research of 
Fletcher et al. (2002:32) found that a large number of individuals were separated from 
their spouses as a result of the expulsion, and a large number was separated from their 
children who remained in the Dominican Republic. When they arrive at the Haitian 
border, they do not receive any form of assistance as there is no system for 
reintegration into the Haitian society. The Haitian government do not provide for 
assistance, and the future prospects of being able to establish a basis for a decent life 
are close to impossible.  
 
Another conflicting issue, related to the migration problem, is whether the 
descendents of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic have a right to obtain a 
legal status within the Dominican Republic. Many of the Haitians living in the 
Dominican Republic today are born there, and live there either as second or third 
generation migrants. This is a question of rights according to national law as well as 
international law. The Haitians claim that the Dominicans are obliged to give 
Haitians born in the Dominican Republic a legal status, according to Dominican law, 
while on the other side, the Dominicans claim that they have no such obligation, as 
the parents of the children born in the Dominican Republic live there on an illegal 
basis. Furthermore, they emphasize the difficulties in determining whether the 
persons that claim they are born in the Dominican Republic, really are born there. 
Pimentel Rivera explains the Dominican position on this issue as follows: 
                                                 
4 Article 22(9) of the American Convention. 
5 Dominican Immigration Law, Law 95, and its regulations. 
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 “[…] The migration towards here is not a migration of workers, but rather a 
 migration to live on the street. A country do not develop with only street- 
 sellers. This population is a burden for the national economy. Haiti has their 
 responsibility regarding this situation. We are obliged to nothing.”  
 (Pimentel Rivera 2003 [interview], my translation). 
 
Despite the resistance to give the Haitians living in the Dominican Republic any 
formal status, the Dominican government and private enterprises use these illegal 
migrants as a cheap labour force, especially within the construction business and on 
plantations (sugar, rice, coffee). Here, they work under devastating conditions, they 
receive salaries below the minimum standard and they constantly face the danger of 
being sent back to Haiti. Reports indicate that on some plantations they are paid in 
vouchers rather than in cash and their salaries are based on the amount of sugarcane 
they cut rather than an hourly or weekly wage. Because labourers are not permitted to 
monitor the weighing of their production, this procedure invites unfairness in wages 
(Human Rights Features 2003). 
 
This is first and foremost a human rights issue, rather than a conflict between the two 
governments. We do not have a situation where the Haitian government claims or 
demands that the Dominican government should give the Haitian migrants working in 
the Dominican Republic a formal status. Despite the occasional deportation of 
Haitians, neither does the Dominican government demand the Haitian government to 
make any efforts to reduce the migration towards the Dominican Republic. Both 
governments do profit from the illegal migration. The Dominican government enjoys 
access to a cheap labour force, and the large migration takes off some of the pressure 
on the Haitian government (Pierre-Antoine 2003 [interview]). The conflict can 
therefore rather be explained as a disrespect of human rights on both sides of the 
island. Human rights are something that has not traditionally been regarded as 
important within the Haitian and Dominican politics (Oslo Dialogue 2001a). It has 
neither been implemented in their culture, nor in their policies. This is a result of the 
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 fact that both countries are relatively new democracies, where there is a lack of a 
strong legal state and this has led to a disrespect of legal norms and constant violation 
of human rights (ibid.). 
Economic relations and the border issue 
Both the Haitian and Dominican population living in the border area are suffering 
from unacceptable conditions and extreme poverty (Oslo Dialogue 2002). It is a lack 
of social service in this area, and the traffic of people and commercials across the 
border is creating a series of severe problems. This is first and foremost related to the 
illegal traffic of migrants, but also to the smuggling of products such as drugs, 
weapons, vehicles, groceries and clothing. The lack of complementing the custom 
laws and the failure of completing their obligations have in many cases led to the 
exercise of violence against persons and communities in the borderlands (ibid.). 
Another great problem in the borderlands is the severe deforestation that has taken 
place over the latest decades. This problem occurs on both sides of the border, and 
affects in a negative manner, both Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Although 
several international agencies and organizations have been working in this area, their 
efforts have not yet led to the desired results (ibid.).  
4.1.2 Who are the actors in the conflict? 
In order to analyze the Oslo Dialogue, we need a precise definition of the actors in 
the conflict and to which extent these actors are represented by the participants in the 
Oslo Dialogue. It is difficult to identify two obvious actors, as there is a complex 
potential conflict, with many different actors. One option would be to regard the main 
actors in the conflict as the Dominican government versus the Haitian government, 
but as I have argued, there is not really a conflict of interest between the two 
governments. This stems from the fact that both governments do profit from the large 
scale migration from Haiti towards the Dominican Republic. The Dominican 
Republic may use these migrants as a cheap labour force, and the large scale 
migration takes off some of the pressure on the Haitian government. This is not to say 
that there is total harmony between the two states. There is a lack of cooperation 
between them, and there have been situations where politicians have used the other as 
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 a scapegoat to increase internal support. However, I argue that related to the 
migration issue, which I have defined as the main conflicting issue, there is no real 
conflict of interest between the two states. Instead, I argue first that the main actors in 
the conflict are the group of migrants living in the Dominican Republic and the 
Dominican government. It is important to stress that this definition is a 
generalization. It is also important to underline that the group of migrants living in 
the Dominican Republic is not an organized group with common interests. 
Nevertheless, this definition of actors will simplify the analysis, as we can give a 
more precise definition of the conflict and the actors’ stand on the issue. Second, one 
can also argue that it is a conflict between the Haitian migrants living in the 
Dominican Republic and the Haitian government. When Haitians or descendents of 
Haitians living in the Dominican Republic are deported, the service provided by the 
Haitian authorities is poor. The system for reintegrating the repatriates into the 
Haitian society is not functioning, and they face poor future prospects for a decent 
life there.  
 
If we use the game theoretic model depicted in chapter 3.2.2 we can imagine the 
following scenario regarding the migration issue. I will first set the group of Haitians 
living in the Dominican Republic as actor HM and the Dominican government as 
actor DG. Actor HM’s preferred outcome is the recognition of being legal citizens in 
the Dominican Republic, including being treated according to international human 
rights laws. A second best outcome is, when they are deported back to Haiti, that they 
will first get the opportunity to take with them their belongings if their residence is 
illegal, or get a chance to bring forth their legal papers if they are living there on a 
legal basis. The worst outcome is the status quo, in which Haitians are occasionally 
sent back without any warning in advance and without being able to gather their 
belongings or to show legal papers. For actor DG, the Dominican government, the 
most preferred outcome is that they can use the Haitian migrants as a cheap labour 
force without giving them any legal status, and deport groups back to Haiti whenever 
there is a need for it. The second best outcome is to give the Haitians a chance to 
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 bring their belongings or show legal papers before they are deported back to Haiti. 
The least preferred outcome will be to give the Haitians a legal status.  
 
Based on the discussion above, using the simple game theoretic model presented in 
section 3.2.2., one could argue that there was no bargaining space between the actors 
on the migration issue prior to the Oslo Dialogue. The preferred outcome for the 
Dominican government would be status quo, and for that reason, a negotiated 
agreement would cause a loss for them relative to no agreement. This can be 
illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 4.1. Absence of bargaining space  
1. Horizontal axis = issue dimension 
2. Vertical axis = Gains (+) and Losses (-) Relative to No agreement (0) 
3. DG – DG’ = Dominican government’s Preference Curve 
4. HM – HM’ = Group of Haitian Migrant’s Preference Curve 
5. dg’ = Dominican government’s BATNA 
    hm’ = Group of Haitian Migrant’s BATNA 
 
The issue dimension (horizontal axis) refers to the migration issue from the 
Dominican government’s point of view. 
 
Based on this figure, we can see that there is no bargaining space between the two 
actors, since the range of acceptable agreements for the Dominican government and 
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 the group of Haitian migrants do not overlap at any point. The Dominican 
government stand to gain from status quo relative to a negotiated agreement, and 
therefore they will not negotiate as this will lead to a loss for them. However, in 
chapter 4.2.1, I will illustrate how the Oslo Dialogue, using a problem solving 
approach, has contributed to creating a bargaining space between the two actors.  
 
Another important aspect to be discussed is to what extent the participants in the Oslo 
Dialogue represent the actors defined above. Based on interviews I did in both Haiti 
and the Dominican Republic, I have indications that the Haitian participants were 
speaking in the interest of the Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic. The 
following quotes strengthen this argument. It would of course have been desirable 
with interviews with all of the participants, but as this was not possible, I base this 
argument on the interviews I did with some of them as well as on several informal 
conversations with G. Laguerre (the coordinator of the Haitian delegation) and the 
working papers produced in Oslo (2001a, 2001b, 2002); 
 
“[…] Very often Haitians have their rights violated, their rights of defence, the 
right of protecting themselves, for example they are in the different side of the 
border, and they are illegal, and sometimes some of the illegal people they have 
some that are legal, but they don’t give them time to show their papers, or they 
don’t give them time or ways to ask for help in front of the authorities who want 
to repatriate them.[…] They just take them and throw them out, so that’s one of 
the problem[…]” (Lemaere 2003 [interview]) 
 
[…] The situation over there is very difficult, and can not be solved from one 
day to another. For example, the Haitians or the descendents of Haitians that 
are born there [in the Dominican Republic] are normally, according to the 
Dominican law, supposed to be Dominicans. (Gregoire 2003 [interview] my 
translation). 
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 Based on these quotes from Lemaere (a lawyer working in a women’s movement in 
the border area and participant in the Oslo Dialogue) and Gregoire (working in the 
Haitian MFA, member of the official mixed commission and participant in the Oslo 
Dialogue), both participants in the Oslo Dialogue, and my general impression after 
interviews with some of the participants, I argue that the Haitian participants in the 
Oslo Dialogue have been speaking for the interest of their fellow citizens living in the 
Dominican Republic.  
 
On the other side I argue that the Dominican participants have been speaking on 
behalf of the Dominican interests in the Oslo Dialogue.  
 
“[…] We need to regulate [the migration] in the sense that we can not allow a 
massive migration in any way […]” (Carvajal 2003 [interview] my translation). 
 
“[…] The population [Haitian] is a burden for the national economy. Haiti 
needs to follow up their responsibility regarding this. […] We are obliged to 
nothing […]” (Pimentel Rivera 2003 [interview] my translation). 
 
As we can see from these quotes from Carvajal (Director of ProCaribe and participant 
in the Oslo Dialogue) and Pimentel Rivera (coordinator of the Dominican 
delegation), the persons are using “we” as in we for the Dominican Republic, when 
addressing the migration problem. Based on this one can argue that the Dominican 
participants (at least some of them) have been speaking in the interest of the 
Dominican state when participating in the Oslo Dialogue.  
 
One could thus argue that the Haitian participants have been speaking in the interest 
of the Haitian migrants living in the Dominican Republic and the Dominican 
participants have been speaking on behalf of Dominican interests regarding the 
migration issue. Although this definition of actors may seem to be somewhat general, 
it provides a useful tool to understand the main conflicting issue and the outcome of 
the Oslo Dialogue. In the next section I will present the Oslo Dialogue, emphasizing 
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 the progress in the process in light of phases a negotiation normally follows as well as 
how the problem-solving approach to negotiations may be used to explain the 
process. After this presentation, I will more precisely define the Norwegian approach, 
emphasizing its goals and objectives.  
4.1.3 The Oslo Dialogue  
As described earlier, Haiti and the Dominican Republic represent two quite different 
realities, both economically, politically and culturally. While the Dominican Republic 
is well on its way to develop sustainable democracy, Haiti has not come very far in 
this process. The democracy in Haiti is not well developed and this complicates work 
with human rights and the dialogue with an historical enemy. Furthermore, the 
history of antagonism and historical mistrust makes the dialogue even more difficult 
(Sandved 2004 [personal correspondence]).  
 
The Norwegian MFA in cooperation with NCA initiated the dialogue between the 
two countries. The method used was to select one central civil society representative 
from each country to assemble a group of people that should participate in the first 
dialogue-meeting in Oslo in May 2001. These coordinators also became responsible 
for the follow-up to the process on the island, as well as the announcement and 
publication of the dialogue. During the first meeting in Oslo, four persons from each 
country and from different sectors of the civil society were participating. This 
meeting did not lead to any concrete results but several topics were discussed, 
including the controversial topic of migration. The parties agreed to jointly identify 
the situation in both countries related to six major themes. That was a description of 
the situation in each country including an evaluation of the relations between the two 
countries; to appoint objectives and strategies for this process; to identify the 
economic situation in each country; to evaluate the question of migration; to identify 
the environmental issue and the public health situation in both countries and to find 
points of common interest and initiatives to promote. Furthermore, the groups agreed 
on the necessity of a continued dialogue and also made an agreement to spread the 
idea behind the process and to create new dialogues in their respective home 
countries (Oslo Dialogue 2001a).  
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The next meeting was organized in Oslo in November 2001. The delegations were 
now extended to ten persons in each. With this extension, more sectors of the civil 
society were represented and more women participated. The media attention after the 
first meeting, the involvement of high ranked Norwegian officials, and the mere 
existence of a dialogue made the process politically interesting (Sandved 2004 
[personal correspondence]). The results of the second meeting were far more concrete 
and specific than of the first one. In three workshops the topics of migration, human 
rights and economy and border issues were debated. Each workshop agreed on a final 
document containing an analysis of the issue and recommendations of further work to 
address the problems. Among the concrete proposals related to the migration issue 
were (Oslo Dialogue 2001b): 
 
• Establish effective control mechanisms at the border. 
• Put pressure on Dominican authorities to find a solution to the problems 
related to the fact that children born in the Dominican Republic by 
Haitian parents often do not receive any form of identification papers. 
• Work to reform the system of customs, with the aim of creating equal 
tariffs, and in this manner encourage trade between the two countries. 
• Work to lower the prices of journeys between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, so that more people can travel back and forth legally. 
• Create forums for dialogue about questions related to the relationship 
between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. 
 
Concrete proposals related to the issue of economic relations and the border situation 
were: 
• Guarantee for the minimum wage of the citizens living in the border 
area. 
• Commerce: Reformation of the custom laws to harmonize the tariff 
implemented in both countries.  
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• Corruption: Develop a national program to reduce the corruption 
through monitoring and controlling; establish institutional mechanisms 
for a bilateral program.  
• Environment: Formulation and execution of bilateral projects and 
programs to improve the environmental situation and favour the 
ecosystem.  
 
Related to the human rights issue, no concrete proposals were made, but the parties 
agreed on the following description of the situation: 
 
• The lack of implementing human rights has resulted in a behaviour that 
affects the relation between the two states.  
• This lack of implementation manifests itself as incapacity to secure the 
right to work in both countries. 
• The situation in general results in a series of conflicts and violations 
according to human rights conventions, especially related to migration 
and commerce.  
 
If we compare these agreements with the different phases a negotiation normally 
follows as described in the theory chapter, one could say that the first two topics have 
reached the third phase, where the parties have agreed on details for the 
implementation of the agreements. Related to the issue of human rights one can argue 
that this has reached the second phase, referred to as the formula construction.  The 
parties have agreed on a common definition of the conflicting issue, but they did not 
come up with concrete proposals for how to solve the problem. 
 
The third, and for the time being, last meeting, was held in Oslo in April 2002. The 
delegations were now further extended to 12 persons in each. These delegations were 
again divided in three different workshops (4 persons from each delegation) to debate 
the three main issues; the human rights situation, the migration problem and the 
economic relations and border issue. These were the same themes as in the second 
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dialogue, but the results and recommendations from the third meeting were far more 
concrete. Related to the question of migration, the concrete proposals were 
principally aiming at revising the official agreements between the two countries as 
well as revising national laws. The agreements and proposals were made both for 
national, bilateral and international level. Among the concrete proposals related to the 
migration issue were (Oslo Dialogue 2002): 
 
• Revise the Protocol of 1999 (see chapter 1.4.2), and if necessary, adopt 
new agreements. 
• Provide legal assistance to the victims of reciprocations. 
•  In Haiti, develop a program for holding back possible migrants; 
establish a program for local development in the areas that provides for 
the majority of the migrants and in addition create information services 
regarding illegal migration. 
• In the Dominican Republic, promote a legislation reform for workers 
and establish an administration of the foreign labour force.  
 
Related to the economic relation and the border issue, some of the concrete proposals 
were: 
 
• Recognition of the necessity of an application of the custom legislation 
in both countries. 
• Integration of the economic relations in the border zone. 
• Realization of a study about the present economic and commercial 
situation in the border area, taking into account earlier studies.  
• Create an information office at the border in both countries to provide 
information about rights and duties related to the laws in both countries.  
• Organize forums and seminars in both countries for merchants and 
other interested in the theme of Dominican-Haitian trade, especially 
about the franchise zone.  
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• Realize different activities in media such as radio, television, 
newspapers. 
• Formalize cooperation between the regulating institutions from both 
countries.  
 
Related to the issue of human rights the delegations did in this meeting come up with 
more concrete proposals: 
 
• Ask for the insertion of a sub-commission of human rights in the 
already established Mixed Commission (La Comición Mixta). 
• Establish a mixed Haitian-Dominican group, to do a follow up of the 
agreements and conventions and to impose liability on the two states 
about the aspects of the human rights. 
• Realize an investigation to find all the bodies working for the defence 
of human rights and identify their specific role. 
• Provide logistical support to the bodies working for the defence of 
human rights.  
 
In some of the cases, the proposals were made for the civil society, and in other cases 
directly towards either of the two governments. Regarding the proposals related to 
legislative, administrative and political reforms, the actions to be followed up by the 
civil society are connected to research, mobilization, information and elaboration of 
proposals. The civil society will therefore play a role as educationist, with emphasis 
on participation from the different organizations and to simplify the people’s access 
to social services and practices of their rights.  
 
If we examine the issue of human rights, we can now see that the workshop agreed on 
concrete proposals for how to solve the problems defined in the second meeting. This 
indicates a progress in line with the phases a negotiation normally follows. One can 
say that from the second to the third meeting, the dialogue over this issue proceeded 
from the phase of formula construction to the phase of working out details. In the 
 second meeting, they agreed that the current situation related to human rights affects 
the relation between the two states and that it results in a series of violations of 
human rights conventions. This is more an acknowledgement and definition of the 
problem, rather than an agreement on how to solve it. However in the third meeting, 
the parties agreed on that both parties should work to insert a sub-commission of 
human rights in the official Mixed Commission, to establish a mixed group to follow 
up the agreements, to identify all bodies promoting the defence of human rights on 
the island, and to provide logistical support to these. These agreements are in line 
with what I in theory described as the third phase; implementation of details. In the 
third meeting, the parties agreed on concrete actions that are needed to be taken in 
order to improve the situation related to human rights. Related to the other issues one 
can argue that they reached the third phase in the second meeting, but still there has 
been progress from the second meeting. 
4.1.4 Phases in the Norwegian approach to peace 
In the theory chapter, I described four pillars upon which the Norwegian peace- 
making efforts are built and, as I concluded, these pillars are attributes Norway 
possesses rather than a specific model for how to act as a third party in a conflict. In 
the following I will elaborate different methods and techniques that have been used in 
different Norwegian peacemaking efforts in order to get a better understanding of the 
“Norwegian approach to peace”. 
 
It is important to notice that one of the most important characteristics is the flexibility  
the Norwegian participants have shown in their role as a third party. Different 
situations with different actors and different types of conflicts require different 
approaches in order to make a peace effort efficient. As P. Skauen (2004) said in a 
speech at the University of Oslo: 
 
“ We do not bring along a model which we try to ”press down over the 
disputants’ heads”. We have to be flexible and adjust ourselves to the different 
situations that occur” (Skauen 2004, my translation). 
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 However, even though the Norwegian peace-making efforts are characterized by 
flexibility, we may extract some similarities from the different conflict situations 
where Norway has been acting as a third party. 
 
As described above, the involvements are to a great extent based upon personal 
experiences and knowledge that stems from persistent engagement and are anchored 
in the local environment. Personal relations with different actors have been important 
in creating relationships and trust between the disputants. This especially applies to 
relations between P. Skauen and some of the participants. In such a process 
specialists from different environments are invited to participate. This may be 
specialists in history, economics and politics. After these persons have discussed and 
analyzed the conflict, the process extends to also include NGOs working with gender 
issues, human rights and media. The participation of the press has its aim to also 
create a political interest. Media coverage and documents produced by the working 
groups is supposed to put pressure on politicians and to commit themselves to the 
problems. At the same time it is considered important to include also the grassroot 
level through local initiatives. This process goes on in parallel with the dialogue 
between specialists, NGOs and politicians. Hence, the process aims to include several 
sectors at different levels of the society. I have elaborated the following figure to 
illustrate of the Norwegian approach to peace, as it has been carried out between 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic: 
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Figure 4.2. The Norwegian Approach to Peace 
 
Based on this figure we see that the participants are representing different 
environments in their respective home countries. The idea is that persons from each 
country jointly are supposed to both identify the conflicting issues, to find possible 
solutions to these and create a plan of action for how to implement the solutions in 
 77
 their respective societies. This plan of action should be implemented in all levels of 
the society; the political level by lobbying to change the legislation and to carry out 
reforms; the middle level to provide information for the public, to create forums for 
dialogue and to investigate further the conflicting issues; the grassroot level to 
communicate the solutions by sharing experiences and by initiating joint activities 
across the border. This approached can be compared with Lederach’s (1993) middle-
range approach. That is, leaders of the civil society are supposed to be responsible for 
carrying out the peace process and to involve both the political level and the grassroot 
level into the process. Furthermore we can see that this approach is similar to what I 
in the theory chapter have defined as the problem-solving approach. The basic idea is 
that the participants are supposed to jointly both identify the conflicting issues, to find 
integrative solutions and to create a plan of action.  
 
As we can see from the above description, this approach differs from the game 
theoretic approach described earlier. The idea has not been to precisely define the 
actors in the conflict for then to select persons that will represent them in the 
dialogue. Rather, the idea is to invite persons that are somehow already committed to 
the issues at stake to meet and jointly try to both identify the problems as well as to 
find possible integrative solutions to these. However, as I will illustrate in chapter 
4.2.1, the simple game theoretic model may be used to explain how the problem-
solving approach has contributed to create a bargaining space between the actors, by 
introducing new perspectives and ideas on how to solve the problems. 
4.1.5 Is the Norwegian involvement a success?  
In order to be able to investigate whether the Norwegian involvement on Hispaniola 
has been a success, we need to develop some criteria for how to measure the 
effectiveness of a third party intervention. It is easier to measure degree of success in 
cases where you already have a violent conflict, than in cases where the third party 
intervention is of a conflict preventive character. In war cases, one could say that the 
third party has had success as mediator, when the parties reach agreements that 
implies an end to violent actions and when the parties somehow are committed to 
this. In a conflict preventive intervention, though, there is no such easy way of 
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 measuring the degree of success. Sceptics to conflict prevention say that such cases 
are based on hope rather than performance (Lund 1996:390). This is because no one 
can tell exactly when possible conflicts will erupt and what to do about them. Also 
critics tends to argue from a single case of failure and to ignore the cases of apparent 
success (ibid.). It would be difficult to argue that all the wars that occur are proofs 
that conflict prevention does not work. In my opinion, this argument is not strong 
enough to say that no efforts of preventive conflict resolution actually have worked.   
 
How then, may we tell whether a conflict preventive intervention has been 
successful? One can say that as long as no violent actions arise between the 
conflicting parties, that there has been successful conflict prevention. This might be a 
valid statement in some situations, but not for all. I argue that in order to analyze the 
degree of success in a conflict preventive intervention, it is useful with a separate 
analysis of every single case. This is because it is difficult to reveal universal criteria 
for both the underlying causes of a conflict and also for the causes of why conflicts 
do not erupt. This taken in to consideration, I will not develop universal criteria for 
measuring the degree of success in this case, but instead investigate the Norwegian 
involvement in light of the Norwegian approach and goals. 
 
An obvious starting point for this investigation is the Norwegian approach and its 
goals behind the process. As described above, the Norwegian approach has been to 
first create a dialogue between representatives of the civil society, including 
representatives from the press, in order to give the process media attention. This 
media attention is regarded to be important for creating political interest. The civil 
society dialogue does also serve an important function for highly ranked Norwegians 
when they meet with Haitian and Dominican top level politicians. This is because 
they can refer to this dialogue, when addressing the conflict. The mere mobilization 
of politicians to participate in the process is also an important aspect to analyze, as 
this has been an important goal behind the process. Furthermore the idea is that the 
civil society itself should play a significant role in the process of improving the 
relations between the two countries.  
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If we set the 1) creation of personal relations across the border, 2) the progress in the 
dialogue and 3) concrete substantive changes as dependent variables, and analyze 
these in light of the Norwegian objectives with their involvement, I argue that the 
process until now can be looked upon as a success. This taking into consideration that 
the MFA and the NCA have involved themselves with a long term perspective and 
that the process still is at an early stage. My argument for this statement is that first of 
all, many contacts and personal bunds across the border have been created as a result 
of the Oslo Dialogue. This cooperation between representatives of the civil society 
and to a lesser extent between politicians is new in the history of Hispaniola.  
 
“I think that in its nature and its method, this initiative which Norway is 
involved in, is the first time it has been done in such a way. Trying to go 
through civil society, […] trying to confront the civil societies in the two 
countries, have them discuss some of the problems, some of the conflicts, […] 
trying to influence the government. I think that method is different and 
innovative, and so far fruitful.” (Laguerre 2003 [interview]). 
 
Based on this, I argue that the creation of personal relations between people across 
the border underline the statement that Norway so far has had success as a third party. 
Furthermore, several politicians are now involved in the process (Skauen 2004 
[interview]). When the Norwegian actors visit the island, they always meet with 
highly ranked politicians in both countries. This is first and foremost persons working 
in the ministry of foreign affairs but they have also met with both countries’ 
presidents. 
 
If we move to the next stage, and analyse the progress in the dialogue, this further 
strengthens the hypothesis that the methods used has been successful. As described 
earlier, we saw that from the first meeting in Oslo to the third meeting, there was a 
significant progress in the agreements reached. In the first meeting, the participants 
only agreed on the necessity to explore and identify the situation in both countries, as 
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 well as to continue the dialogue and to spread the idea behind the process in their 
respective countries. In the second and third meeting, we saw that the agreements 
were far more specific, and concrete proposals were elaborated for how to solve the 
problems. Using the three phases a negotiation normally follows as a measure of 
progress, I have shown that all three topics have reached the third phase. Based on 
this, I argue that the Norwegian strategy as a facilitator and the use of a problem-
solving approach to the negotiations has proved to be efficient in terms of progress in 
the dialogue.  
 
Next to be investigated is whether the progress in the dialogue has led to any 
concrete, substantive changes in the relation between the two countries. Based on the 
Oslo Dialogue, new initiatives have been taken. This is in first place between church 
leaders from each country that have established a dialogue (earlier referred to as the 
church dialogue). They had their first meeting in 2002, where ambassadors from both 
countries met with representatives of both governments (Skauen 2004 [interview], 
Langsholdt 2004 [interview]). This is a locally driven process financed through the 
Norwegian MFA. This year there has also been a conference between teachers from 
both countries. In addition, C. Pimentel Rivera who was the leader of the Dominican 
delegation in the Oslo Dialogue has initiated a forum for dialogue on the island. They 
meet once a week to discuss Dominican-Haitian relations. The persons that 
participate in these meetings are basically representatives of NGOs and other 
institutions that are involved in the issue of Haitian-Dominican relations. These 
meetings have among other things led the Dominican government to establish a 
separate Secretary of State for Haiti6 (Skauen 2004 [interview]). 
 
Considering these three variables, one could say that the Norwegian involvement has 
been a success. Still, it is important to point out that such a process also has its 
weaknesses. Although the process has led to some concrete changes, far from all the 
agreements reached in Oslo have been implemented. There is a large gap from 
                                                 
6 This Secretary of State is relatively new (September 2004), and because of this I have not been able to analyze its 
function. 
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 reaching an agreement on paper to carry out and implement such agreements. One 
could also argue that it is easier for representatives of the civil society to reach such 
agreements than it would have been for highly ranked politicians. This argument is 
related to the commitment-problem in negotiations. Representatives from the civil 
society organisations do not possess the positions, nor the power, to implement the 
agreements requiring government-level decisions. Consequently, they are not 
committed to actually reform legislations or carry out the follow up of such reforms. 
Although they have committed themselves to lobby the government to reform the 
legislation, for such reforms to be carried out, highly ranked politicians possessing 
the necessary power that finally needs to commit themselves to complete such 
changes. The civil society process has served a function to, in first place, identify the 
conflicting issues and to find possible solutions to these, where the civil society 
organizations are supposed to play a role in implementing the agreements reached. 
Second, the process has been important as a first step to involve highly ranked 
politicians in the process.  However, it remains to see whether the participants in the 
Oslo Dialogue and their collaborators in their home countries have the necessary 
skills and influence to implement all the agreements reached. The political turmoil in 
Haiti in 2004 has made the continuance of this process difficult in the country and the 
focus now is to ease the tensions between different political groups within Haiti 
rather than between Haiti and the Dominican Republic. This indicates that the process 
also has its vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the Norwegian authorities have involved 
themselves with a long-term perspective, and to this point the process is at an early 
stage. I thus argue that the process up until now has been a success, but that it 
remains to be seen whether all the agreements reached in Oslo will be implemented in 
the two countries. 
4.2 Analyzing the Oslo Dialogue and the role of Norway 
The above discussion led me to the conclusion that the Norwegian involvement up to 
this stage may be regarded as a success. This conclusion constitutes the starting point 
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for the following analysis of the hypotheses portrayed in chapter 3.4. In this section I 
will analyze each of the hypotheses emphasizing their importance in the process.  
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: A problem-solving approach to the negotiations 
Based on the description above, I argue that the Oslo Dialogue has taken form as a 
problem-solving approach rather than a more traditional negotiation over different 
topics. The two delegations have been divided into workshops, where they together 
have identified the main conflicting topics, and together found possible solutions to 
(some of) these problems. The participants in the dialogue have not regarded each 
other as adversaries negotiating against one another, but rather solved the problems 
by taking joint decisions. This is a result of the Norwegian approach, where the 
groups in the first meeting jointly identified the conflicting issues and created the 
agenda for how to continue the process. In the second and third meeting they were 
divided into three workshops, one for each topic, where they in cooperation found 
possible solutions to the conflicting issues and created a plan of action. 
 
The working papers produced in Oslo strengthens the argument that the Oslo 
Dialogue has taken form as a problem-solving approach. This is because the 
participants have debated over and agreed on solutions that will contribute to reduce 
some of the worst consequences of the present situation, rather than simply 
negotiating over whether the migrants working in the Dominican Republic should 
receive status as a legal citizen in the Dominican Republic. The following agreements 
support this argument (Oslo Dialogue 2002): 
 
• Work to lower the prices of journeys between Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic, so that more people can travel back and forth legally. 
• Provide legal assistance to victims of reciprocations. 
• Develop a program for holding back the population in Haiti. 
• Promote a legislation reform for foreign workers in the Dominican Republic. 
• Reciprocations of Haitians should be executed in a manner where international 
laws and rules are respected. 
  
What can be understood from this is that the agreements reached, in general, are 
solutions on how to regulate the migration, and how to reform the legislation in the 
Dominican Republic and in Haiti so that the migrants are treated according to human 
rights laws. This indicates that the participants have approached the main conflicting 
issue with a problem-solving approach, because the agreements suggest solutions that 
not necessarily solve the core of the problem, but rather reduce the worst 
consequences that results from it. The Dominicans will lobby their governments to 
reform their legislation for immigrant workers, and ensure that deportation of 
Haitians is executed in a manner that is compatible with human rights laws. On the 
other side, the Haitians will work to establish programs for holding back their 
population and create a system for re-integrating the expatriates in the Haitian 
society.  Hence, the debate in the Oslo Dialogue has not been on whether the Haitian 
migrants should get a legal status or not, but instead agreements on how to work to 
ensure that they are treated according to human rights laws. This is in line with what 
Rubin et al. (1994:171) have described as an integrative solution. As described in the 
theory chapter, such solutions are most likely to develop from creative thinking. 
Integrative solutions are based on the idea that for some issues, it might not be 
possible to reach solutions unless a way can be found to join the parties’ interests. 
More mechanical agreements, as for example compromises, could have been 
unsatisfying to one or both parties and the issue would have been likely to come up 
again at a later stage.  
 
Using the simple model depicted in chapter 4.1.2 (figure 4.1.) one could argue that 
the problem-solving approach in the Oslo Dialogue has contributed to create a 
bargaining space between the actors. Earlier, I argued that prior to the Oslo Dialogue 
there was no bargaining space between the defined actors, as the Dominican 
government gained from status quo relative to a negotiated agreement. However, 
after the process, one could argue that there has been a change in the preferences of 
the Dominican government. This is connected to the costs for the Dominican 
government in a situation without a negotiated agreement. First, the Oslo Dialogue 
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 has suggested solutions to the migration issue that might be beneficial for the 
Dominican government compared to status quo. For example, one could argue that 
reducing the travel costs between the two countries will be beneficial for the 
Dominican government, as they then will have better control over the Haitians 
migrating to the Dominican Republic. In addition, if the Haitian government develops 
a program for holding back the population, this would be beneficial for the 
Dominican government. More generally, one could argue that regulating the 
migration will be beneficial for the Dominican government, as they then will have 
more control over the migrants, without loosing the supply of foreign workers. 
Furthermore, one could argue that the Oslo Dialogue has led to a certain pressure 
upon the Dominican government related to human rights. This is both bottom-up 
pressure from the local civil society organizations and top-down pressure from 
international organizations and other states. This pressure may contribute to further 
change the Dominican government’s preference curve, as the costs by not acting 
increases. 
 
The change in the Dominican government’s preference curve, and how this change 
has created a bargaining space, may be illustrated as follows: 
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Figure 4.3. A shift in the Dominican government’s preference curve 
 
1. Horizontal axis = issue dimension 
2. Vertical axis = Gains (+) and Losses (-) Relative to No agreement (0) 
3. DG – DG’ = Dominican government’s Preference curve prior to the Oslo Dialogue 
4. HM – HM’ = Group of Haitian Migrant’s Preference curve 
5. DG1 – DG1’ = Dominican government’s Preference curve after the Oslo Dialogue 
6. dg’ = Dominican Government’s BATNA prior to the Oslo Dialouge 
    hm’ = Group of Haitian Migrant’s BATNA 
    dg1’ = Dominican Government’s BATNA after the Oslo Dialogue 
7. hm’ – dg1’ = Bargaining Space 
8. E = Point of “Equitable” solution, where gains of both parties relative to no agreement are equal 
 
This figure illustrates how the Dominican government’s preference curve has moved 
upwards from DG-DG’ to DG1-DG1’. This implies that the Dominican government 
now realizes that their BATNA lies closer to the group of Haitian migrants’ ideal 
point than they first thought. This realization further implies that also the Dominican 
government now believes that there exists a bargaining space. The group of Haitian 
migrant’s preference curve will not be affected by the Oslo Dialogue and is held 
constant (HM – HM’). The change in the Dominican government’s preference curve 
has now created a bargaining space between the two actors (hm’ - dg1’), where the 
gains of a negotiated agreement are larger than no agreement also for the Dominican 
government. Point E in the figure illustrates the gains the Dominican government will 
be able to achieve through a negotiated agreement. This indicates a gain relative to no 
agreement. This illustration shows how the simple game theoretic model may be used 
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 to explain the result of the problem-solving approach in the Oslo Dialogue. 
Therefore, I argue that these theories are not totally incompatible, but may in 
combination be used to explain this particular process. 
 
It is important to point out that a more traditional negotiation with concessions and 
reciprocation of concessions would have been difficult both because of the 
complexity in the topics at stake, and because the negotiations have been held 
between representatives of the civil society. These persons do not possess the 
positions, or the power to make concessions and reciprocations on behalf of the state. 
I thus argue that the use of a problem-solving approach, by finding integrative 
solutions, has contributed to an efficient progress in the dialogue. The process has 
created a political interest in both countries and at this stage, high ranked politicians 
from both countries are aware of the process and involved in it. The Norwegian 
actors maintain the political interest by visiting both countries on a regular basis, and 
on these visits they always meet with politicians, mostly connected to the ministries 
of foreign affairs (Hoem Langsholt 2004 [interview]). 
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Overcoming the barriers to negotiate 
In the theory chapter I described three barriers to the opening of negotiations based 
on Pillar (1983), and elaborated methods and techniques that may be employed to 
overcome these barriers. In the following I will discuss to what extent these barriers 
have been in force in this particular case and how the MFA and the NCA has 
contributed to facilitate the process of overcoming them. 
 
The first barrier identified by Pillar was that parties to a conflict tend to exaggerate 
the extent to which interests conflict, and the most important way of overcoming this 
barrier was a face to face meeting between the top leaders of each side. However, I 
argued that an entrusted third party may work as a convener between the two parties 
in order to reduce their mistrust. This barrier has not existed in this case, but still I 
argue that there exists mistrust between the participants from the two countries. The 
Oslo Dialogue has contributed to reduce this mistrust. As described earlier there has 
always existed mistrust and suspicions between people from the two countries. 
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 Especially within the Dominican society there exists a prevalence of deeply ingrained 
antihaitianismo (Fletcher & Miller 2004). History, media and Dominican 
stakeholders constitute different dimensions of this issue, and are regarded as 
significant barrier to substantive changes, especially in Dominican policy and 
practice (ibid). The dialogue in Oslo has contributed to reduce some of these 
mistrusts that exist. As Dilia Lemaere, a Haitian woman working in a women’s 
association in the border area and a participant in the Oslo Dialogue said to me: 
 
 “[…] I have been to the first and the last meeting, and from the first time to the  
last time I could feel a better understanding of each other. We were not 
enemies, we were mostly partners, even if we did not like each other, we did 
not like what was done to one another.” (Lemaere 2003 [interview]).  
 
Although this barrier in the first place only has been overcome within the groups that 
have participated in the Oslo Dialogue, I will argue that it is a step forward in the 
Haitian-Dominican relation. It is, however, important that these changed attitudes 
somehow will be transferred to the general population as well: 
 
“[…] If we could expand those experiences to […] more groups instead of 
twelve people. Even if those people work with groups, work with associations, 
but if that would expand or if we could do activities on the field to expand that, 
that would be better” (Lemaere 2003 [interview]). 
 
J.C. Delva, the leader of the biggest press association on Haiti (AJH) underlines the 
role of the press in the process to contribute to less mistrust between the populations 
on Hispaniola: 
 
“[…] What we are saying, is that you can have governments of good will, you 
could have people of good will, but if you don’t have the press with you, you 
will not be able to change anything. And we understand that we have a role to 
play, because we also are responsible for the bad opinions that people on both 
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 sides have of each other. Because if they know something, they know it through 
us, through the journalists, through the press. So we are the ones who can 
change that, who can repair that. Not the government can do it, because it is in 
the mind of people. And we form those opinions in the mind of those people. 
We are the one who have to undo it, and we have the commitment to work 
towards that goal and make sure that those two people feel closer together, 
and forget a little bit of the past and move forward” (Delva 2003 [interview]).  
 
Pillar’s second barrier is the reluctance to move first. An important feature in respect 
to overcoming this barrier, is the duration and timing of the intervention. An effort 
from a third party forces the conflicting parties to indicate whether or not they are 
ready to talk. The Norwegian approach to peace is based on the assumption that the 
parties themselves are willing to negotiate: 
 
“[…] peace can only be achieved by the parties involved. It cannot be imposed 
from abroad. Unless the government and people of a country are genuinely 
willing to confront the problems that are causing the conflict, there is little that 
even the best informed and most benevolent outsider can achieve.”(Petersen 
2003). 
 
Therefore, the MFA will not take a role as a third party unless the parties themselves 
are willing to negotiate, and therefore the timing of a Norwegian involvement will 
always take place at a moment where there is willingness on both sides to reach an 
agreement. Within the group that participated in the Oslo Dialogue there exists a 
desire on both sides to face the problems and to try to solve them, and for that reason, 
it is my opinion that this barrier has not been strongly in force within this group. This 
stems from the fact that these people are already somehow committed to the issues 
and because of this they possess the necessary motivation to solve the problems. 
However, this barrier could have been forwarded as an explanation for the 
involvement of politicians. But as I will argue later, the barrier to involve politicians 
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 is rather connected to the fact that both governments are satisfied by the status quo 
than any reluctance to move first.  
 
The third barrier is the imposition of conditions to the opening of negotiations. A way 
to overcome this barrier is to arrange the negotiations in a neutral environment. 
Holding the negotiations in Oslo has had several advantages. First, the participants 
have been able to discuss free from external pressure and influences of constituents 
and media. In addition, it might be an advantage that they may debate without other 
forms of distractions. If for example the meetings had been held in either of the two 
countries or in another country in the region, they would most likely use the 
opportunity to visit friends for instance (Skauen 2004 [interview]). By holding the 
dialogue in Oslo, they are more likely to be focusing on the negotiations without 
distortions (ibid.).  
  
In sum, I argue that the barriers identified by Pillar (1983) have not been strongly in 
force in this case. Still we can identify some problems that may be linked to these 
barriers. I have shown how the Norwegian representatives have contributed to make 
the parties overcome these problems. Although these barriers have not been strongly 
in force in this case, I have explored other significant barriers to the opening of 
negotiations between the Haitian and the Dominican delegation in the Oslo Dialogue. 
I will especially emphasize three barriers.  
 
In the first place, the Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic do not constitute a 
group that is organized or recognized as a possible counterpart for eventual 
negotiations by the Dominican government. This barrier is one of the most difficult to 
overcome in this case. The Norwegian representatives have sought to overcome this 
barrier, or more precisely to avoid it, by selecting persons from the civil society that 
are somehow committed to the conflicting issues. They have done this by inviting 
persons that will speak on behalf of Haitians living in the Dominican Republic. Based 
on the working documents produced in Oslo and the interviews and informal 
conversations I had with Haitian participants, there is no doubt that these persons 
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 were promoting the interest of their fellow citizens living in the Dominican Republic, 
when they were in Oslo.  
 
A second barrier that has been difficult to overcome is rooted in the political 
instability on Haiti. It has been difficult to get actors that are in many ways opposed 
to each other to form a group that may participate in the Oslo Dialogue: 
 
“ […]to start the civil society process is a difficult thing to do, not only 
different sides of the Haitian society coming together, but coming together 
around a common cause and to meet other civil society element as a group on 
the Dominican side[…]. (Laguerre 2003 [interview]). 
 
This barrier was overcome because the NCA managed to identify an actor, G. 
Laguerre, with the necessary skills and networks to form a functioning group. This 
barrier has thus largely been overcome through local efforts rather than as a result of 
continuous Norwegian interference. 
 
In a broader context one could argue that yet another barrier in this particular case has 
been present. The politicians of both countries have, before the initiation of the peace 
efforts, been reluctant to solve any of the problems identified in the Oslo Dialogue. 
This stems basically from the fact that both governments have gained from the status 
quo, especially related to the migration issue. The pressure on the Haitian government 
is reduced when people chooses to migrate, while the Dominican authorities use the 
Haitians migrants as a source of cheap labour.  As a result of the Oslo Dialogue 
however, politicians in both countries have started to involve themselves more in 
finding solutions to these problems. The process itself has thus managed to overcome 
this barrier. 
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 4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Norway as a neutral actor 
Trust and impartiality 
I have defined a neutral third party as one regarded by both conflicting parties as 
impartial and as not having any vested interest in the outcome of negotiations. 
However, I argue that trust between the conflicting parties and the third party is more 
important than absolute neutrality. 
 
In the Oslo Dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic the mutual trust 
between the negotiating parties and the Norwegian representatives as the third party 
has been important in terms of progress in the negotiations. As the delegations consist 
mainly of people from civil society organizations, including people that for years 
have been cooperating with NCA, the parties have the necessary trust and confidence 
with Norway and the Norwegians involved as facilitators. In interviews with 
participants from each country’s delegations, the fact that Norway is a small country 
with no hegemonic pretensions and with no vested interest in the outcome of the 
negotiations is looked upon as an important attribute: 
 
“[…] and a lot of times subjectivity gets in the way and complexes and 
presumptions, so having a broker which […] don’t have a history in either one 
of the countries traditionally as a power being able to do the mediation. We 
think that was the most important aspect of what Norway has brought to this 
process” (Laguerre 2003 [interview]). 
 
“[…] It is a country [Norway] that has been occupied with the Swedish and 
the Danes and does not have hegemonic pretensions. […] It is a non-
imperialistic role, this role of assistance and accompaniment and I think it is 
the most adequate methodology. When the international community decided to 
work in Haiti, Norway was the most suitable government to initiate a process 
with this methodology […]” (Pimentel Rivera 2003 [interview] my 
translation).   
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Although Norway is regarded as impartial to the outcome of the negotiations, I argue 
that the relation based on trust and confidence between the participants in the Oslo 
Dialogue and the Norwegians involved as facilitators also has been important. As 
NCA has been working on the island since 1979, it has created a broad level of 
contacts, especially with local NGOs and leaders from the civil society, and also with 
people from the grassroot level as well as from the political sphere. During my 
fieldwork I got a chance to have several informal conversations with some of the 
participants in the Oslo Dialogue. All of them emphasized especially their friendship 
with Petter Skauen from the NCA. Although they did not explicitly emphasize this 
friendship as important, I got the impression that this has been important in terms of 
motivation for keeping the process alive. This relation, combined with the reputation 
that Norway has obtained as a facilitator for peace, has contributed to simplify both 
the creation of delegations to participate in the negotiations and also in the progress 
of the negotiation itself. Langsholdt (2004 [interview]) and Skauen (2004 [interview]) 
emphasize the necessity of trust and reliability between the Norwegian 
representatives and the conflicting parties. Also important is to maintain this trust 
throughout the process. 
Negotiating in a neutral environment 
Another important attribute, is the opportunity the Norwegian actors have in offering 
a neutral location for the negotiations. A common barrier in the first phase of a 
negotiation is the imposition of conditions, which includes details on site and time for 
the negotiations to be held (Pillar 1983). When a third party has the ability to offer 
such conditions, it is easier for the conflicting parties to agree on when and where to 
hold the negotiations. For the third party it becomes easier to exercise control over 
the process and for the negotiating parties to focus on the substantive issues.  
 
The three meetings in the Oslo Dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
have been held in a neutral environment at the Holmenkollen Park Hotel in Oslo. It is 
clear that this has been advantageous for both parties, and for Norway as the third 
party. As the coordinator of the Haitian delegation stated: 
 93
  
 “[…] and we also think that the venue has played an important role in terms of  
 leaving our natural environment behind and being able to look at things more 
 calmer, cooler and colder, without the traditional and everyday happenings.”  
 (Laguerre 2003 [interview]). 
 
It is likely that it would have been more difficult to arrange the meetings on the island 
of Hispaniola. First of all, there would have had to be an agreement on in which of 
the two countries the negotiations should have been held, and in addition the parties 
would most likely have been exposed to some sort of external pressure from other 
groups. Second, they are able to be more focused on the issue, as there are no external 
distractions. For the Norwegian delegation as the third party, it is clear that by 
arranging the negotiations in Oslo, and on Norwegian premises, the Norwegian 
participants has had the opportunity to exercise more control over the negotiation and 
the information, as well as maintaining the flow of communication between the 
parties. 
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4: The strategy as facilitator 
In the theory chapter I elaborated three strategies a third party may use in a conflict 
situation. These were the third party acting as a communication facilitator, the 
procedural strategy and the use of directive strategies. These strategies reflect the 
degree of involvement from the third party.  
 
The Norwegian model falls in somewhere between the first and the second strategy. 
MFA states that they will only assist conflicting parties as a facilitator, but they do 
also contribute to the continuance of the negotiations in e.g. deadlocked situation. 
This role is taken first and foremost with the assumption that agreements reached by 
the conflicting parties themselves will be more substantive than agreements reached 
based on some sort of pressure from the third party. However, the Norwegian 
participants have in situations worked actively in order to motivate the parties, as well 
as participated in the construction of the agenda. But this role has been more an 
advisory role than a direct involvement in the negotiations. Characteristic for the 
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 Norwegian approach to peace is that the MFA starts with a goal rather than a plan. 
The idea is that the Norwegian participants play a facilitating role as companions and 
organizers, but it is the parties themselves that are responsible for the progress of the 
process (Sandved 2003 [personal correspondence]). The conflicting parties are 
supposed to work out the agenda, and take initiatives. The Norwegian participants 
contribute by introducing new perspectives, and find new solutions together with the 
parties involved (Langsholdt 2004 [interview]). As a facilitator, their task as the third 
party is to patiently listen to the parties and encourage new initiatives, but not to be 
responsible for the progress and solutions to the problems. At the same time, the 
Norwegian actors as facilitators need to keep the process within the framework 
worked out by the parties (Sandved 2004 [personal correspondence]). 
 
In the dialogue, the Norwegian strategy differs from the second strategy described 
above in the sense that the negotiation do not fall within the framework of a 
traditional bargaining model. First and foremost, the conflicting issues do not fall 
along a continuum and it would have been difficult to reach agreements using a more 
traditional negotiation model. The issues at stake are complex and calls for other 
methods in order for solutions to be reached. The negotiation is more of a dialogue 
where the parties have to commonly find ways to solve the problems related to the 
political instability in Haiti, the migration problem and the economy and border 
issues between the two countries. In the first meeting in Oslo in May 2001, the two 
delegations jointly defined the conflicting issues to debate. In the next two meetings, 
the delegations have continued their work based on the first meeting, now with the 
aim of finding ways to solve the problems between the two countries. The Oslo 
Dialogue falls more within the framework of problem-solving negotiation rather than 
within a traditional bargaining model. It follows a model were different workshops 
are established for the discussion over the different topics at stake.   
 
Based on interviews with participants in the dialogue, I found that they emphasize the 
strategy the Norwegian participants have used as important: 
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 “[…] I think the role they play as assistant and companion for cooperation is 
the best, and I think it is the most adequate methodology […]” (Pimentel 
Rivera 2003 [interview] my translation).  
 
 “[…] Their role is positive in an uncommon way. What they have offered us is  
 their services, they don’t tell us what to do. The MFA and the NCA have used  
 an approach where we have to do it ourselves, but with accompaniment. It is 
 an attitude that makes all parties feel confident. The role of Norway is a role of  
 service, friendly assistance and cooperation” (Laguerre 2003 [interview]). 
4.2.5 Hypothesis 5: The use of an NGO network 
In the theory chapter I discussed some of the advantages and disadvantages in using 
NGOs as mediators in negotiations. The main advantages is first, as NGOs often 
work on the grassroot level, that they have the capability to create trust and loyalty 
with the local communities. Second, in cases where we have a collapse of 
government, NGOs and religious institutions may be the only sources of authority 
that have any influence. Third, as an NGO normally has been involved in 
development programs or similar, prior to a conflict, they are familiar with the 
culture, ethnic groups and development problems in the country at present. The main 
disadvantages in using NGOs as mediators is first that they may understand the 
conflict from a local point of view, and misunderstand the impact and dynamic of the 
conflict at a national level. Another common problem is that there are often too many 
NGOs and a lack of coordination between these. This may lead to situations where 
the different NGOs nullify each others work. There have also been situations where 
NGOs fail to consider the political implications of their work and by doing so, 
contribute to exacerbate the conflict rather than making peace. 
 
The close cooperation between MFA and NCA has, I will argue, reduced the possible 
disadvantages with an NGO acting alone as a third party. First of all, MFA as a 
political actor eliminates the danger that the third party will only regard the conflict 
from a local point of view. Second, the danger of failing to consider the political 
implications has been reduced, as the MFA, representing the Norwegian government, 
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 has experience with this kind of work. Also there has constantly been a close 
cooperation with P. Skauen from the NCA and the representatives from the MFA. 
Consequently, it is not the NCA alone that has driven this process, but rather the 
MFA in cooperation with P. Skauen from the NCA. Furthermore, it is important to 
underline that the problems identified above may be more relevant when discussing 
the involvement of local NGOs in peace-making efforts. Because of NCA’s 
international character some of these possible disadvantages are not relevant. For 
instance, since NCA is not rooted in local interests, it is not very likely that NCA will 
understand the conflict from a local point of view. 
 
An important advantage in using the local network of the NCA is the trust and 
friendship that exist between representatives of the NCA and the local NGOs 
involved in the process. This relation has contributed to ease tensions between 
representatives from both countries. 
4.2.6 Hypothesis 6: Civil society takes responsibility 
The Oslo Dialogue between Haiti and the Dominican Republic, falls within what 
Lederach (1993:44-45) describes as the middle range approach, as the two countries’ 
delegations that have been participating in the Oslo Dialogue consist mainly of 
people from the civil society, such as lawyers, leading academics, religious leaders 
and leaders of local human rights organizations. In the second and the third meeting 
held in Oslo, there has also been a government representative from each country. This 
way of work can be illustrated with the following figure based on Lederach (1993) 
  
 97
  
Figure 4.4. The middle range approach 
 
A vital criterion for the MFA in the selection of participants has been to find people 
that are somehow already committed to the issue of Haitian-Dominican relations 
(Sandved 2003 [personal correspondence]). The idea is that with a persistent 
commitment to the issue, these people will have some sort of knowledge regarding 
the problems, as well as having a lasting interest in finding solutions. The persons 
that participated represent a wide range of sectors within the civil society and this 
makes it possible to reach different groups of the population in the local follow-up of 
the process. Furthermore, representatives of the civil society are often intermediaries 
in the sense that they represent the grassroot, but at the same time have a position of 
power that gives them a natural link into the political sphere.  
 
A question that calls for a discussion is whether the representatives of the civil 
societies have the necessary power and skill to influence both the top politicians and 
the grassroot in a way that makes the negotiations worthwhile. It is clear that 
arranging negotiations between persons without the necessary power or skill will be 
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 useless in the sense that eventual agreements will not have a chance of being 
implemented. In the case between Haiti and the Dominican Republic I have argued 
that there has been a lack of political interest to solve the problems between the two 
countries. This is because the Dominican Republic benefits from a large scale Haitian 
migration in the sense that the Dominican government may use (or abuse) these 
migrants as cheap labour within different public sectors. On the other side, the 
migration of people towards the Dominican Republic, will take off some of the 
pressure that lies on the Haitian government. A large scale migration implies a lesser 
population to create working places and to ensure a minimum of human rights 
(Pierre-Antoine 2003 [interview]). However, by arranging negotiations between 
representatives of civil society organizations that are already somehow committed to 
the issues at stake, has been efficient in creating a political interest for the issues 
related to first and foremost the migration problem. This interest has been created 
through lobbying from the local participants in the dialogue as well as through the 
local and international media that has been invited to the Oslo Dialogue. Second, 
when highly ranked Norwegian officials have visited the two countries, they have had 
the opportunity to refer to this dialogue when separately meeting with the top 
politicians of both countries (Sandved 2004 [personal correspondence]). As described 
earlier, the civil society process have contributed to a change in the preferences of the 
Dominican government. First, because the suggested solutions, are solutions that in 
the long run will be beneficial also for the Dominican government. Second, because 
the process has put a certain pressure upon the Dominican government, the costs by 
not acting have increased relative to not acting. 
4.2.7 Hypothesis 7: The long-term perspective 
According to Sørbø et al. (1998:6) external actors should have a long-term 
perspective on their involvement. This statement is based on the fact that solutions 
tend to be temporary if not all parts of a society are somehow included in a peace 
making process. In this regard, the civil society organizations should play a vital role, 
as they normally have broad support and have options that political leaders do not 
have for political reasons (ibid). For example, they are not bound by political 
decisions in the same way as politicians may be. 
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In situations where a peace agreement is reached between government leaders or 
between government leaders and rebel groups, there is a need to also involve the civil 
society in order to increase the legitimacy of the agreement. If the majority of the 
population is not involved, a negotiated agreement does not necessarily imply a 
lasting peace. This is because different groups or movements may continue to fight 
despite an agreement reached between the political elites (Sørbø et al 1998:6). 
 
These arguments are also valid in regard to the Norwegian involvement on 
Hispaniola. But there are also other reasons why a long term perspective is important 
in order to achieve a successful intervention. In the first place, the motivation for the 
Norwegian MFA and NCA to initiate such a process stems from the immediate link 
between the desire to provide humanitarian assistance and initiating a peace making 
effort. A conflict in a country or region will be an obstacle for the provision of 
humanitarian assistance. This is because it might be difficult or dangerous to reach 
certain areas due to violent groups’ roadblocks for instance, but also because of the 
difficulties related to promoting economic development, human rights and 
international laws in conflicting areas. Hence, a peace making effort is part of a 
broader involvement of providing humanitarian assistance. 
 
Second, the nature of the conflict between Haiti and the Dominican Republic 
demands a long term perspective. As described earlier the two countries have been in 
conflict for several decades. Although it is no war at present, the history of 
prejudices, violent clashes and constant meddling in each others affairs has created a 
tense relation between the two states. In addition, the political instability in Haiti, 
which turned into a large scale protest against former President Aristide in 2004, has 
contributed to worsen the situation. It is clear that the situation at present does not 
change over night. Therefore a long term perspective on the involvement is an 
absolute necessity in order to improve the relations both between different political 
segments internally on Haiti, but also between Haiti and the Dominican Republic.  
 
 100
 4.2.8 Hypothesis 8: When to initiate mediation – the ripe moment 
In the theory chapter, I introduced the concept “the ripe moment” based on Zartman 
(1991). In short, this moment refers to a situation where both parties to a conflict 
realize that both want to get out of the conflict using peaceful methods. In other 
words, it is a question of timing an intervention. The five components identified by 
Zartman (1991) are in general based on a war situation, and it is not straight forward 
to transfer them to a latent conflict as in this case. However, I argue that some of the 
components may be used to analyze the timing of the Norwegian involvement. 
Therefore I will not analyze whether the moment was ripe as defined by Zartman, but 
rather use some of the components to analyze whether the timing of the intervention 
has been important. I argue that it is only two of the components identified by 
Zartman that may be regarded as important in this case. The first is related to creating 
a formula for a way out, and that both parties in principle are willing to choose this. 
Based on the Oslo Dialogue, I argue that these meetings have produced a formula for 
a way out. Although they do not agree on all the proposals made, they have produced 
several important proposals that both parties agree on. Second, since the parties have 
driven the process and taken the initiatives, I thus argue that the parties are willing to 
choose this formula. In addition to the components identified by Zartman, I argue that 
conjuncture has been important for the timing in this particular case; 
 
“[…] As for anything, such as this process, conjuncture is important, and when 
this process started it was at a time when there were burning issues of Haitian-
Dominican migration and the question of human rights in the Dominican 
republic, the treatment of Haitians, and also there were incidents with the 
Dominican military and Haitian refugees and there were a couple of cases were 
people were killed unjustly. […] I think therefore that was an important 
conjuncture. […] I think that period was important because there were some focus 
if you will on the issue.” (Laguerre 2003 [interview]). 
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 C. Pimentel Rivera from the Dominican Republic is more doubtful regarding the 
importance of the timing, but still he argues that the moment at which the Norwegian 
initiative occurred was at a time when there was willingness to solve the problems: 
 
“[…] We are at a time where the level of the conflict is not as profound as in 
Guatemala, Ecuador or Colombia. We are at a time of establishing directives 
for preventing a conflict to erupt, and it is an important moment. […] But we 
can not compare this moment with other moments.” (Pimentel Rivera 2003 
[interview] my translation). 
 
Based on these quotes and the fact that there existed willingness to meet on both sides 
of the island, I argue that the Norwegian involvement took place at a good time. I do 
not argue that the initiative took place at the ripe moment as defined by Zartman 
(1991), but rather that the timing of the intervention was good due to the fact that 
there had been some focus on the issues prior to it, and because the conflict was not 
too profound at the moment.  
4.3 The Norwegian motivation 
This thesis focus on how the Norwegian MFA in cooperation with NCA has 
contributed to the preventive conflict resolution process between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic. However, it does not treat the question of why Norwegian 
authorities engage in conflict resolution projects, such as this project as well as other 
projects such as Israel/Palestine, Sri Lanka, Guatemala, Burundi, Rwanda, Mali, 
Mozambique and Sudan. A brief discussion of this question is necessary to 
understand the Norwegian involvement related to its foreign policy in general. 
 
First, according to Vollebæk (2003:16), Norwegian involvements in such projects 
may be explained from a geopolitical point of view. After the cold war, the US 
interest in Norway, with its location close to the Soviet Union, has declined. This 
decline has created a need for the Norwegian authorities to find new areas where 
Norway may be of interest for the US and greater European countries. The 
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 Norwegian authorities have in recent years actively worked to create an image of 
Norway as a humanitarian superpower, as this may work as a door opener to the 
worlds great capitals as Washington and Brussels (ibid). Another geopolitical aspect 
that has been forwarded to explain why the Norwegian authorities involve themselves 
is the possible gains Norway stand to gain from an international order based on 
peace, rule of law, democracy and human right (Helgesen 2002). Helping to promote 
such ideals internationally is ultimately in the interest of any small democratic 
country. Third, providing long-lasting effects of humanitarian assistance presupposes 
the absence of armed conflict, and has led to an increased focus on both conflict 
resolution and preventive conflict resolution. As the Norwegian minister of foreign 
affairs, Jan Petersen, said in a speech at the joint Norwegian-Belgium seminar the 21 
of may 2003: 
 
“[…] Norway has for quite some time been a fairly large provider of 
humanitarian assistance and an active partner in international development 
operations. This stems from a desire to help alleviate human suffering and 
promote human security. […] we believe we are in a position to contribute in a 
broader sense than just financially. Economic assistance can never replace 
political solutions to conflicts that are by their nature political. If we can 
provide political support to efforts to create peace, we are supporting the very 
same objectives that we are promoting through our humanitarian assistance, 
development coordination, and dialogues on human rights.”  
 
The Norwegian motivation for involving itself in peace making efforts thus stems 
from both geopolitical reasons as well as the focus on providing humanitarian 
assistance.  
 
For example, in the case of Mali, NCA started with the aim of establishing a long 
term development project in the Northern region after the droughts in the mid-80s. A 
part of this project was to provide emergency aid to the most vulnerable groups. 
However, when a rebellion took place from 1990-1996, the NCA also contributed to 
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 facilitate a dialogue between the government and different rebel groups as a peace 
making effort (Lode 1996). Similarly, in Guatemala, NCA first got involved after the 
earthquake in 1976. Later, when the civil war broke out, they leaned on their 
competence, and their relations with different parts of the society, from the grassroot 
to the top-level, in order to facilitate dialogue and to promote peace between 
conflicting groups (Sørbø et al 1998). The experiences from peace-making effort in 
Guatemala have also been a starting point for the Norwegian involvement on 
Hispaniola. It is the very same persons that were responsible for facilitating the peace 
process in Guatemala that are responsible for the process on Hispaniola (e.g. Petter 
Skauen and Arne Aasheim). They have thus been able to use their experiences from 
the Guatemalan process on this process. Furthermore, NCA have for several decades 
been working with humanitarian aid on both sides of the island, and through this, they 
have established relationships and trust with different actors from different levels of 
the society. These relations, as well as experiences from this kind of work in 
Guatemala, have been important factors for the initiation of the peace process on 
Hispaniola.  
 
Although the link between humanitarian assistance and peace-making efforts is an 
important factor in explaining the Norwegian motivation, there are also other factors 
that need to be considered. Tvedt (2003) has carried out a study regarding the relation 
between power, foreign policy and humanitarian assistance in Norway. In general, he 
argues that the distinction between foreign policy and humanitarian assistance in 
Norway has become blurred, and that power relations, within what he describes as the 
South-political system in Norway, are important in understanding why Norway 
engage themselves in peace and reconciliation projects. He argues that the motivation 
cannot be understood from an altruistic or ideological perspective isolated, but needs 
to be studied in light of perspectives of realism. This implies, at the level of MFA, 
that for instance humanitarian assistance is increasingly becoming a part of foreign 
policy and peace-making efforts in order to promote the Norwegian role in the 
international political system. 
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 This argument may be relevant to explain why the Norwegian authorities have 
increasingly engaged themselves in this kind of processes. However, I will argue that 
it does not explain why individual organizations and actors involve themselves. It is 
too simplistic to explain the NCA involvement for instance as a pure reflection of the 
geopolitical interests of the Norwegian authorities. It is true that the involvement of 
the Norwegian authorities has facilitated the role played by NCA, but it is also 
important to take into consideration the long-lasting presence of the organization in 
the region. NCA’s involvement is thus as much a result of their own strategies related 
to humanitarian assistance as it is a reflection of Norwegian geopolitical strategies. 
However, the increased involvement of MFA has created the possibility for an 
organization like NCA to expand its area of intervention from pure humanitarian 
assistance and development project at the local level to also include peace-making 
efforts at national level.  
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 5. Conclusions 
The overall purpose of this thesis has been to examine how the Norwegian MFA in 
cooperation with NGOs contributes to preventive conflict resolution by creating and 
facilitating dialogues and negotiations between parties in a potential conflict 
situation. The involvement of MFA in cooperation with NCA in the current peace 
process between Haiti and the Dominican Republic has constituted the basic case 
study of this thesis.  
 
The research question I formulated as: Why has the Norwegian MFA in cooperation 
with NCA achieved success as a third party in the dialogue between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic? 
 
It is difficult to measure the degree of success in a conflict preventive involvement, 
because it is hard to reveal all the causes of why conflicts do not erupt. Still, I have 
argued that the Norwegian involvement on Hispaniola has been a success. I have 
operationalized the degree of success in light of the Norwegian approach and 
objectives, the progress in the Oslo Dialogue and the substantive changes that have 
developed as a result of the Norwegian involvement. Based on an investigation of 
these variables I have concluded that the Norwegian involvement to this stage has 
been a success. First, all the personal relations that have developed across the border 
as a result of this process, have resulted in a locally driven dialogue between some of 
the participants. Furthermore, after the flood in May 2004, organizations from each 
country cooperated in providing the population with emergency aid. Second, I have 
described the progress in the dialogue based on the working papers produced in Oslo 
and this further strengthens the statement that the process has been successful. From 
the first meeting in Oslo to the third meeting, we have seen that the agreements 
reached and proposals made went from what I described as the first phase in a 
negotiation (e.g. the diagnosis phase) to the third phase of implementation of details. 
Related to substantive changes a separate Secretary of State for Haiti has been 
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 established in the Dominican Republic as a result of the process. Also local initiatives 
have been taken, especially between church leaders from each country. But far from 
all the agreements reached in Oslo have been implemented, and the renewed political 
turmoil in Haiti is an indication that the process also has its vulnerabilities. My main 
argument, however, is that the process still is at an early stage and one can argue that 
the process until now has been a success, but it remains to see whether all the 
agreements reached in Oslo will be implemented in the respective countries. 
Findings 
My first hypothesis was that the Oslo Dialogue has taken form as a problem-solving 
approach to negotiations and that this as been important for the progress in the 
dialogue. I have shown that the parties jointly have defined the conflicting issues, and 
in cooperation worked out agreements on how to solve them. This is in line with how 
I have presented the problem-solving approach to negotiations. I have also shown that 
the agreements reached not necessarily are agreements on the main conflicting issue, 
but rather an agreement on how to reduce the worst consequences that result from it. 
The main agreements resulting from the Oslo Dialogue are related to the regulation of 
reforms of legislation in both countries so that the migration will be reduced and the 
migrants will be treated according to human rights laws. These findings strengthen 
the hypothesis that the Oslo Dialogue has taken form as a problem-solving approach 
to negotiations, and has proved to be efficient in terms of progress in the dialogue. In 
addition, I have illustrated how the problem-solving approach in the Oslo Dialogue 
has contributed to create a change in the Dominican government’s preference curve, 
and created a bargaining space between the actors. This illustration shows that a 
simple game theoretic model and the problem-solving approach is not totally 
incompatible, but may in combination be used to explain this particular process. 
 
The conclusion of the second hypothesis was that the personal relations between the 
Norwegian actors and people at top level, middle range level and grass root level in 
both countries have made the parties overcome the barriers to negotiate. I argued that 
common barriers to the opening of negotiations identified by Pillar (1983) have not 
been strongly in force in this particular case. One can still argue that there have been 
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 barriers to the opening of negotiations in this case, and I have shown that the methods 
used in this process have been efficient in terms of overcoming these barriers; the fact 
that the Haitian migrants living in the Dominican Republic is not an organized group 
that may be a possible counterpart for the Dominican government in eventual 
negotiations;  the fact that the political instability and internal conflicts on Haiti has 
led to difficulties in creating a group to cooperate in the dialogue; and the lack of 
political interest to solve the problems. The first barrier has been overcome or rather 
avoided by letting representatives from the civil society that are somehow committed 
to the issues at stake, represent the Haitian migrants and speak their cause in the Oslo 
Dialogue. The second barrier was the difficulties to assemble a Haitian delegation, 
assembling of persons that normally are in opposition to one another, to work for a 
common cause. This barrier has largely been overcome as a result of local initiatives. 
G. Laguerre, the coordinator of the Haitian delegation, has been important in this 
respect, as he has been the one responsible for creating the Haitian delegation. The 
third barrier is related to the lack of political interest to solve the problems. I have 
illustrated how the Oslo Dialogue has created political interest to solve the problems, 
both because of its media attention, but also because of lobbying from participants in 
the Oslo Dialogue and the Norwegian representatives.  
 
Discussing the third hypothesis, I concluded that the Norwegian actors were not 
regarded as having any vested interest in the outcome of the negotiations and that this 
precondition was important for the dialogue. Both C. Pimentel Rivera from the 
Dominican delegation and G. Laguerre from the Haitian delegation have in 
interviews emphasized that this attribute has been important. However, based on 
several informal conversations with these two and other participants, I have learned 
that they also have emphasized their personal relations with P. Skauen from the NCA 
as important. This relation, I argue, has been important in terms of trust between the 
participants and the Norwegian representatives. 
 
Discussing the fourth hypothesis, I concluded that Norway acted only as a facilitator 
and did not involve themselves in the negotiations, and that this strategy was 
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 important. Based on different strategies a third party may use according to Touval 
and Zartman (1985), I have argued that the Norwegian representatives have used a 
strategy that falls somewhere between the strategy as a communication facilitator and 
the procedural strategy. It is the parties themselves that are responsible for the 
progress in the process and are supposed to work out an agenda and take initiatives. 
However, the Norwegian representatives have contributed by introducing new 
perspectives and in finding solutions together with the parties. Based on interviews 
with both delegations’ leaders, I have argued that this strategy has been a fruitful 
strategy in terms of progress in the dialogue.  
 
The conclusion of hypothesis five was that the MFA’s use of NCA’s network has 
been important for the process. I have portrayed some common advantages and 
disadvantages by using NGOs as a third party. Common disadvantages connected to 
an NGO as a third party is that they often seem to be regarding the case from a local 
point of view, and misunderstand the impact and dynamic of the conflict at a national 
level.  As a result, there have been situations where NGOs have failed to consider the 
political implications of their work and by doing so, contributed to exacerbate the 
conflict rather than making peace. I have concluded that the common disadvantages 
have in this case been avoided as it is the MFA as a political actor that has been 
responsible for the process. Furthermore, the use of the NCAs network, and the 
personal relations between P. Skauen and actors on both sides on the island, has 
contributed to create trust both between the parties, and between the parties and the 
Norwegian representatives as the third party. 
 
In discussing hypothesis six, I concluded that the involvement of the civil society in 
the negotiations was important in order to reach substantive solutions. Although the 
process still is at an early stage, I argued that the involvement of the civil society has 
been important. This is mainly because of the lack of political interest to solve the 
problems as both governments profit from the large scale migration. Therefore, the 
involvement of civil society representatives that are somehow committed to the issues 
has been important. However, it remains to be seen whether this group of people have 
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 the necessary power and skill to influence both governments in a positive direction. 
The civil society is also important as they have a role to play related to the 
agreements reached in Oslo. While some of their tasks are to influence the 
government, they will also play a vital role by providing information and assistance 
to the population.  
 
In concluding the seventh hypothesis, I underlined the importance of the long term 
perspective of the Norwegian involvement for the process. First, I argued that a 
peace-making effort is part of a broader involvement of providing humanitarian 
assistance since conflicts will constitute an obstacle for the provision of humanitarian 
assistance. In this particular case, I have also argued that the nature of the conflict 
demands a long term perspective. This is because of the history of the conflict and the 
fact that the mistrust and prejudices between them is something that can not be 
changed in a short period of time.  
 
My last hypothesis discussed whether the involvement took place at a ripe moment. I 
concluded that the moment was not ripe as defined by Zartman. However some of the 
components identified by Zartman may be interpreted as important in terms of timing 
of the intervention. The timing of the Norwegian involvement may be regarded as 
important as there had been some focus on the issues at stake prior to the 
involvement. However I argue that it is difficult to compare this moment with other 
moments. One can not say what had happened if the involvement had taken place five 
years earlier or five years later.  
The Norwegian involvement in a broader context 
In this thesis, I have analyzed different aspects of the Norwegian involvement, which 
to this stage have been important for the progress in the process. I have not sought to 
develop an all-embracing method that is applicable for solving all sorts of 
international conflicts and disputes, but rather I have analyzed different aspects that 
made this particular involvement a success.  It is important to point out that there 
exist certain contextual circumstances that may be regarded as necessary 
preconditions in order for such a process to be initiated and carried out. First, there is 
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 willingness on both sides of the island to solve the problems. The two countries of 
Hispaniola will always be neighbours and both countries realize the necessity of 
finding ways to live together and to improve the relations. Without this willingness, 
the Norwegian authorities neither could nor would initiate such a process. The 
Norwegian actors do not possess the power to press conflicting parties into finding 
solutions. Furthermore they will not initiate a peace effort unless the parties 
themselves are willing to negotiate (e.g. the Norwegian model as described by the 
MFA). Second, the fact that representatives of civil society organizations from both 
countries have been willing to carry out such a process, has been a vital precondition 
in this particular case. Without this willingness, it is obvious that initiating a civil 
society process would have been difficult. Third, the Norwegian authorities possess 
certain characteristics that other countries may not possess. The fact that Norway 
does not have a history as a colonial power and is not member of the European Union 
is important aspects in this regard. Also important are the previous relations between 
the Norwegian actors and the participants in process. Furthermore, the close 
relationship between the Norwegian state, humanitarian organization, researchers and 
journalists is unique, and may be looked upon as an advantage in a peacemaking 
effort. The politics regarding issues such as humanitarian aid and peace efforts in 
Norway have, according to Tvedt (2004:216), in Norway developed almost free of 
criticism. 
 
When discussing whether the Norwegian approach in this case may have relevance 
also in other conflicts, these circumstances must be considered. My point is that the 
findings from this analysis cannot be regarded isolated, but must be regarded in light 
of its context.  
Theories of preventive conflict resolution 
I have in this thesis applied theories on a conflict preventive case that normally are 
meant to analyze already erupted conflicts. I have shown that these theories are 
suitable to explain this conflict preventive involvement. First, I described the progress 
in the Oslo Dialogue as following more or less the same development as predicted by 
Zartman and Berman (1982). One can argue that the dialogue over the three 
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 conflicting issues has moved from phase one (the diagnosis phase) to the phase of 
formula construction and finally to the phase of implementation of details. Although 
the debate over the different issues did not reach the third phase at the same time, I 
have argued that in the third meeting in Oslo, all of the issues had reached the phase 
of implementation of details.  
 
Furthermore, I have argued that the problem-solving approach to negotiations is the 
most suitable theory to explain the progress in the dialogue, compared to more 
traditional theories of negotiations. This is because of the nature and the carrying out 
of the dialogue in Oslo. As described in chapter 4, the participants have jointly 
identified the conflicting issues and jointly worked out possible solutions. They have 
not made concessions and reciprocation of concessions over the different issues, but 
rather sought to find integrative solutions. Based on the description of the Oslo 
Dialogue in light of this theory, I have shown that this approach to solve conflicts 
also has proved to be efficient in a conflict preventive case. When analyzing the role 
of the Norwegian MFA and NCA in light of theories of the third party role in 
negotiations, we have seen that the participants in the Oslo Dialogue have 
emphasized as important the very same attributes as predicted in theory. This is first 
and foremost the nature of Norway as the third party, including neutrality and trust 
and previous relations with the parties. Additionally, the Norwegian strategy as a 
facilitator has been emphasized as important by the participants.  
 
Although these theories have proved to be applicable for a conflict preventive case, I 
have argued that the three barriers to the initiation of negotiation identified by Pillar, 
have not been strongly in force in this particular case. This can be explained in light 
of the nature of this particular case, but I argue that these barriers are more likely to 
exist in cases were there is an already erupted conflict or declared war. 
Limitations of the Norwegian initiated process 
I have described the Norwegian involvement to this point as a success, but it is 
important to stress that such a process also has its weaknesses. As the Oslo Dialogue 
has been carried out between representatives of civil society organizations, one could 
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 argue that it is easier for such actors to formulate solutions, than if the dialogue had 
been between government representatives. This argument is related to the 
commitment-problem in negotiations. Representatives from the civil society 
organizations do not possess the positions, nor the power, to implement the 
agreements aimed for the political level. Consequently, they can not commit to 
actually reform legislations or carry out the follow up of such reforms. Based on this, 
I argue that it is easier for them to formulate a solution, than if they were committed 
to reform the legislations. Although they have committed themselves to lobby the 
government to reform the legislation, I argue that for such reforms to be carried out, it 
is highly ranked politicians that possess the necessary power that finally needs to 
commit themselves to complete such changes. The civil society process has served a 
function to, in first place, identify the conflicting issues and to find possible solutions 
to these, where the civil society organizations are supposed to play a role in 
implementing the agreements reached. Second, the process has been important as a 
first step to involve highly ranked politicians to the process. Although the Norwegian 
actors regularly meet with politicians in both countries, and have met with both 
countries’ presidents, there is still a gap between discussing the issues, to highly 
ranked politicians committing themselves to solve the problems. My point is that the 
civil society process has been a success in including the middle-range level, the 
grassroot level and in creating political interest for the issues. However, for the 
Norwegian representatives to reach their ultimate objectives of the involvement, 
highly ranked politicians from both countries need to commit themselves to such 
agreements.  
 
The theoretical framework, in which this study is based upon, is normally applied on 
negotiations between state leaders or persons provided with the necessary authority to 
negotiate on behalf of the state. In this case, such negotiations has been practically 
impossible, as the two governments profit from the present situation, and one can 
argue that there is a lack of willingness from both countries’ governments to solve the 
problems. This lack of willingness, I have earlier described as a barrier to 
negotiations between the two governments. Therefore, the Norwegian MFA and the 
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 NCA have concentrated on creating a dialogue between actors that are willing to 
participate and share a common interest in finding solutions to the problems. This has 
been a first step in both creating long lasting efforts by civil society organizations as 
well as committing top-level politicians to involve themselves in finding solutions to 
the conflicting issues. I have in this thesis demonstrated that the theoretical 
framework presented is applicable also on this type of negotiations, and that the 
strategy employed by the Norwegian actors may in a broader context be regarded as a 
strategy to overcome barriers to initiating negotiations between state leaders. 
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 Interviews 
 
The interviews in the Dominican Republic and on Haiti where either carried out in 
English, Spanish or in French with an interpreter. When referring to interviews in 
English, I have written it as it was said by the respondent. I have myself translated to 
English the interviews carried out in Spanish. 
 
In the Dominican Republic 
Carvajal, R.    Leader of Pro-Caribe (NGO in DR). Interview 06.05.03. 
Mota King, L.  Leader of an Evangelic Church Organization   
    Interview 08.05.03.  
Pimentel Rivera, C.   Coordinator, Dominican Delegation. Interview 05.05.03 
Telesforo, I.    Bishop. Interview 08.05.03 
 
In Haiti 
Delva, J.G.  Leader of Jounalist Assosiation (AJH). Interview 
13.05.03. 
Gregoire, N.  Consultant at the Haitian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/Member of the official Mixed Commision between 
Haiti and Dominican Republic. Interview 14.05.03. 
Laguerre, G.      Coordinator, Haitian Delegation. Interview 16.05.03. 
Lemaere, D.    Lawyer, leader of Women’s Movement (Haiti). Interview 
     15.05.03. 
Pierre-Antoine, P.   Director of the Official Migration Office (Haiti). Interview  
     15.05.03. 
 
In Norway 
Hoem Langsholdt    Principal Officer at the Norwegian MFA. Interview  
     08.11.04. 
Sandved, I. S.    Administration and project consultant at the Norwegian 
Church Aid, Oslo. Interview 03.04.03. Personal 
correspondance 2002 – 2004.  
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 Skauen, P.          Expert-consultant at the Norwegian Church Aid, Oslo. 
Interview 01.11.04. 
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 Appendix 1 Interview guide 
 
The questions asked differed from person to person, depending on his/her position. 
During the interviews, I sought to receive answers on the following questions: 
 
1) How do you define the conflict? 
2) Who are the actors in the conflict? 
3) What do you regard as the main conflicting issues? 
4) What is an acceptable solution for you regarding these issues? 
5) How do you regard the possibility of reaching an agreement with the other part 
with respect to these issues? 
6) What have you done to implement the agreements made in Oslo? 
7) What concrete results have been achieved? 
8) What is the government’s stand on the issues defined in the Oslo-dialogue? 
9) How do you try to influence the government? 
10) What are the advantages you have, as a representative of an NGO, that the 
government do not have in this peace effort? 
11) What do you consider as the most important outcomes of the Oslo Dialogue? 
12) What do you regard as the most important help you get from Norway? 
13) Do you look upon the Norwegian representatives as not having any vested 
interest in the outcome of the negotiations? 
14) Do you regard the timing of this initiative as important? 
15) Do you consider the process as a success? 
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